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By Letter of 4 February 1982 the PoLitjcaL Affairs Committee requested
authorization to draw up a report on the potiticaL aspects of relations be-
tween the Community and the United States of America. By Letter of 18 February
1982 the president of the European Partiament authorized the committee to
report on this subject. The Committee on AgricuLture, the Committee on Economic
and trlonetary Affairs and the Committee on ExternaI Economic Relations were
asked for an oPinion.
At its mceting of ?l-?9 January 1982 thc PoLiticaL A{frlre Connlttcc
appointed l,lrs Gredal rapporteur. At its meeting of 2E-30 Aprt t' 19E2
the committee decided to draw up an interim report and to forward it to thb
European ParLiamcnt/US Congress delegationrxhich was due to mcet from
21 to 26 June 19E2.. This interim report uas adopted by the PoLiticaLAffairs
Committee at its meeting of 26 Hay 19E2 (Doc. 1-300/82) and the motion for
a resotution was adopted by the European ParLiament at its sitting of
16 June 19E21.
At its sitting of 14 October 198?, Partiament referred to the PotiticaI
Affairs committee the motion for a resotution tabtcd by ttlr croux and others
on the need to improve the structures for thc diaLogue between the European
Community and the United States (Doc. 1-69E/EZ)'
At its sitting of 16 Novcmber 19E3 ParIiement rcferrcd to thc PoLiticaL
Affairs committee the motion for a resotution tabLed by fttr Kyrkos on the
tarrciing of US mititary forces in Grcnada (Doc. 1-949/83).
At its meeting of 23 and 24 November 1983 the PoLitica[ Affairs Committcc
decided to draw up a finaL report on poLitica[ relations between the European
community and the united states of America and appointed ttlr Hlnsch rapporteur.
The poLiticaL Affairs Committee considered the present report at ':ts
meetings of ?5-?7 January 1984 and 28 February-1 t{arch 1984'
At the Latter meeting, the
for a resotution bY 18 votes to
PoLiticaI Affairs Commirtee adopted the'motion
1 with 2 abstentions.
1 oJ ,o. c 1B?, 19.1.1982, p. ?4
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The foLLowing took part in the vote: ltlr FERGUSSoN, acting chairman and
thi rd vi ce-chai rmani trlr HAAGERUP, f i rst vi ce-chai rnani itrs CHARZAT, second
vice-chairmani I{r HINSCH, rapporteurl l,lr BAILLOT (deputizing for llr IIARCHAIS),
ilr BgCKLET (deputizing for i{rs LENZ), trlr CROUX (deputizing for ltlr DESCHAiIPS),
trtr DE PASOUALE (deputizing for ilr PAJETTA), Lord D0UR0 (deputizing for
Lord BETHELL), Lady ELLES, tlr GERfiOSTOPOULOS (deputlzing for ltlr B0URNIAS),
tir HABSBURG, t{r von HASSEL, ilr KLEPSCH, }lr LAL0R, Iir ltlccARTIN (dcputlzlng
f or ttr PENDERS) , trtr d ' oRtrtEssoN, trlr scHI ELER, Si r Janrcs SCoTT-HoPKINS, ttlr SEGRE
and trlr sllill,loNET (deputizing for [tlr BARBI).
The opinion of the Committee on Agriculture is attached. The opinion
of the Committee on Economic and ilonetary Affairs wiIL be published separateLy.
The Committee on ExternaL Economic ReLations decided not to deIiver an opinion.
The report Has tabled on 6 fiarch 1984.
The deadLine for tabLing anendments to this report wiLL be indicated in
the draft agenda for the part-session at which it lril.L be debated.
-3a- PE E8.473ltin.
COI{TET{TS
Page
A. it0Tl0t{ FOR A RESOLUTI0N ...........o........................... !
B. EXPLANAToRY STATEITIENT ... ...................................... 15
ANNEX I: Resutts of the potl conducted in September 19E3
by the AtLantic Institute on the tro questions
quoted in the explanatory statgment .................... 38
ANNEX II: ilqtion for a resolution tabted by ilr Croux and
others on the need to improve the structures for
the diatogue bettcen the European Connunity and
the United States (Doc. 1-698/EA) ...................... 39
ANNEX III: I[otion for a resotution tabled by ]ir Kyrkos on thc
tanding of US mil.itary forces in Grcnada(Doc. 1-9491E3) ..... .............................. 41
OPINION OF THE COI'IIiIITTEE ON AGRICULTURE .......... ..... 4?
-4- PE EE.473llin,

AIIOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
I
on the poLiticat relations betyeen the European Community and the United States
of America
Tlre European ParIiament,
- having regard to its resolution on the impact of the CAP on the external
retations of the European Communityl,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Externat Economic Re[ations
on economic and trade retations betreen the European Community and the United
States of America2,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Externat Economic Relations
on EEC-USA trade relations in the stee[ sectors,
- having regard to its resolution on the potitica[ aspects of relations bettreen
the Community and the United States of America4,
- having regard to its resolution on the situation in Grenadas
- having regard to the motion for a resotution tabted by ttlr CROUX and others
on the need to improve the structures for the diatogue betueen the European
Community and the United States (Doc . 1-69E18?> 
'
- having regard to the motion for a resotution tabled by ilr Leonidas KYRKOS on
the Landing of us miLitary forces in Grenada (Doc. 1-9491E3),
i
-'having regard to the report of the PoLiticaL Affairs Comrnittee and the opinion
'of the Committee on Agriculture (Doc. ),
1
' 
,oJ No. c ?4?, 7 Jul.y 1983, p. 76? pe arr.sog
3 're ae.oso
4 o.t trto. c 18?, 19 Jul.y 19E2, p. ?5 and interim report by tlrs GREDAL on the
'potiticaI aspects of retations betyeen the Community and the United States
of America (Doc. 1-300/82)
5 o,t ,,1o. c 34?, 17 November 1983, P. 49
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A. consciorr of the distinctive nature of reLations betveen the European
Community and the United States of America, characterized by:
1. the European origin of a large proportion of the American
poputation and the cuLturaL, potiticaI and economic ties bct]reen
the USA and the Feoptes of Europer going back morc than
200 yearsi
2. the same basic convictions founded on raspact for hunln rlghtr, thc
fundamentaI sociaL and poLiticaL frecdoms and thc prlnclptcr o{
democratic government uhich uere first devetoped and estrbLighed by
their peopLes against a background of mutuaI inftuence and
encouragement;
3. the efforts of the uSA to protect and preserve freedom in Europe in this
century, their contribution to the reconstruction of the European economy
and the promotion of European unity after the Second hrlorld War;
4. closety interwoven economic and trade poticy jnterests bet],een the two
most poverfuI industriaI entities in the worLd;
5. a common interest in providing, through the AtLantic ALIiance,
pol.iticat and miLitary safeguards for thcir dcmocratic sociaI orders
which, yhite the differenccs bctrcen East and l{cat stltl' pcrsist,
wiLL inevitabLy caLt for a ioint stratcgy rnd coordinatcd rcsponscs;
6. comp[ementary region.t .no gl.obat responsibi I'ities arising f rom thei r
differ.ing historicat ties tJith other parts of the r.ortd and their
particuLar economic and strategic interestsl
B. conscious of the fact that the retationship between the Community and the
USA has run into difficutties which go beyond the sectora[ confticts of
i nt e rest s;
C. concerned that the dispute on particuLar sectoraL matters shou[d not cause
a deterioration in reLations and shoutd not destroy the basic trust ncccssary
betreen partners and aLIies;
D. recognizing that it has become necessery to take stock of thc reletions
betyeen the USA and the Conrmunity as a regult of changes ln the econonic,
poLiticat and mititary batance of pouer in thc rortd, and notably:
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1. the rise of the European community to the position of a Leading
economic polrer, and its increasing poIiticaI infLuence;
the continuing trortd econonic recession and the globaL shift in the
terns of trade, both of vhich factors are jeopardizing and under-
nining the internationaI economic, conoerciaI and monetary agreements
entered into since 1945;
the grouing dependencc of an increasing number of countries on the
economic and monetary poLicy decisions of the USA;
the changes brought about by advances in ueapons technology in the
geostrategic basis for the mititary security of the uestern uor[d
and the resuLting tensions in the Attantic ALtiance;
the intensification of the East-tJest conftict, yhich is reducing the
margin for manoeuvre of the European partnersl
the increasing importance of the Pacific to the USA whjch reduced the
re[ative importance of the European partncrsl
E. recogniiing that in thc fieLd of external policy a relationship betrpen
equal partners is the onty retationship rhich corrcsponds to thc basic
internaI poLiticaI values of ]Jestcrn denocraciesl
F. concerned at the danger that differences of opinion over the objcctives,
methods and limits of the international poticies pursued by the major
polrers could tead to a situation in vhich the Attantic partners become
aIienated from each other;
G. convinced that ctose and lasting reLations betueen the United States of
America and theConmunity and its ilernber States vi[[ make an essential
contribution to the preservation of vortd peace, that the prospects
of a soLution to the econoiligcommerciat, external and security policy
problems can be brought ctoser onLy by an inprovement in the relations
betyeen Europe and America, and that to this end special efforts viLL
have to be made on both sides of the Atlantic;
as regards current politicat is.sues
1. Notes that differences of opinion can occur due to different perceptions
and interests of the USA on the one hand, and the Community on*tfe other,
and takes the viey thet these differences.particularLy in ereas such as
?.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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agriculture and steet are bound to occur in a free
economic partners;
2. Betieves that with good-ri[t on both sides they
Is convinced, however, that the disruptions in
cIimate caused by high interest rates is adding
difficuLties of finding a sotution;
3.
partnership between
are amenab[e to sotution;
the overatI economic
considerabLy to the
4. Stresses that high interest rates have a de[etorious effect not onLy on
the economies of Europe yhich depend on the dollar as a key currency but
atso on the economies of other countries, particuLar[y in the Third tJortd;
5. Considers that these factors can contribute to high unemptoyment and
depLetion of resources outside the USA and coutd lead to potiticat in-
stabiLity in other parts of the yorld and run counter to ]lestern security
i nt e rest s;
Is aware on the one hand that the consequences of this pol.icy for Europe
are so serious partLy because the Community has as yet no conmon economic
and monetary poLicy and draus attention to its repeated demands for pro-
gress in this field as a matter of urgency;
CaLl.s on the other hand on the Government of the United States to consider
the conseguences for foreign poticy of decisions made on the basis of
doinestic poLicy considerations and to shou[der the responsibitities arising
from the countryts dominant economic position;
Is concerned at the fact that the tensions in the Atlantic Attiance are
increasingl.y tending to have repercussions on reLations bet'ween the USA
and the Community and cal[s for the utiLization, improvement and consotid-
ation of the machinery for consuItation;
Takes the viey that the inordinate dependence of bJest European States on
the US security guarantee leads to one-sidedness and domination in the
atIiance and creates the need for an independent European contribution
to tJestern security within the attiance and the development of a European
security poIicy at its basis;
6.
7.
8.
9.
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10. CaLts for the permanent consultations in the franevork of European
pol.iticaL Cooperation to be extended to inctude retations lith North
America and to be used to give greater ueight to European interests in
the AtIiance;
11. CaL[s on the Atliance to continue lts ctforts torQrds ltrlctcr arns
control and positive disarnanent in both East and lest;
1?.
13.
BeLieves firml.y that such..a poticy is in the interests of
this continent, that it uitl. heLp to make the Attiancers
more effective and that it shoutd therefore be pursued;
, ,;
Emphasizes once again its doubts as regards the potitical'
of trade embarEos;
the people of
security poticy
effect iveness
15.
14. Hopes in particutar that the serious dispute over the European Siberian
gas pipeLine project, in yhich the single-minded and united stance of
the Ten finally caused the USA to give ray, uitl serve as a tesson that
partners must respect afid take into.eccount one another's specific
interests i
Takes.the viey that, uhite there is a need for US involvement in the
lrliddle East, the Communityr, in pursuit of the Community tiddte East
poLicy devetoped in the framework of European politicat cooperation, can
also make its oyn contribution to a solution of the probtems as a corot-
Laiy of its efforts to secure peace in Sinai and Lebanon and in the
context of its gLobat ilediterranean poLicy;
Draws attention.to the Community's continuous poticy of association and
cooperation uith the countries of the ilediterranean, Africa, the
Carribean.and the Pacific and to the aehievements of the Community and
its t{ember States in the fieLd of devetopmcnt aid and is convinced that
such forms of cooperation, vhich are based on partnership and help the
countnies of the Third llortd to pave the ray for econornic stabitity
themsetves, make ah important contribu.tion to safeguarding pcace in the
ror Id;
Sees devetopment poIicy as ar"isrxitabte f ie[d for joint or coordinated
endeavours and believes that the Community and the USA shoutd, as a
16.
17.
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matter of urgency, come to a basic understanding on the rnatter of co-
operation rith the Third llortd particutarty in internationat fora;
its reqards future relations
16. Reaffirms its conviition that ctose, trusting and lasting relations
betyeen the USA and the Community are vitrl, to both pertncrr rnd
esscntial. to thc dcfence of thclr free ray of Llfc, the furthcrancc
of thc deve[opment of just and hunanc condltlons in rtt prrtl of th: rcrtd
and the maintenance of vortd peacei
19. BeLieves firmty that the cul.tivation and extension of retations vi[[
ca[[ for speciaL and unremitting efforts on the part of both partners;
20. Is resolved to make its orn contribution to this processing;
a regards a new starting point for retations
21. hbpes that retations uitL bc pl,eced on a sound ney footing adeptcd to
meet the changcd conditions in Europe rnd thr uorl,d;
22. Takes rs its bcsis in this connGction thc prlnclpl,c of r prrtncrrhlp
between equats thich atone can do justica to tha strcngth of thc tro
partners and the importance of their relations;
23. Proposes that the differences on economic and security poLicy natters
should be pressed into the service of e neu and fruitfut cooperation
and that agreenent shou[d be reached on individuaL but conpLemcntary
and coordinated roles in internationat retations;
24. Is auare that the Community must speak yith one voice to a greater
extent than hitherto, particutarty on externaI and security poLicy issues,
and must put itself foruard as a strong, setf-contained prrtncr of the
United States;
25. Catl.s once again in this connection to. ertcrnat and gccurity potlcy
matters to be brought yithin the ambit of Gnnunity poticy, for the
strengthening of the Communit yrs institutions and for e nore efficient
organi2ation of its decisionrnaking proces3, end drars ettention to
its proposats for the reform of the 0omnunity;
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26. Appreciates the Long constructive reLationship betueen Europe and the
USA and beLieves that European unity wiLL heLp to bring the ttJo partners
cLoser together;
a regards the measures to be taken by the tuo partners to improve rclatjons&
?7. Stresses that timety consu[tation and the comprehensive mutuaI exchange
of information on aLI matters affecting the tuo parties must lle centraL
to their re[ations anci must be taken into account by both partners;
28. Hopes that, whiIe fuLl.y respecting the internationaI commitments they
have entered into, the USA and the Community wi[[ undertake to sett[e
their differences on economic and trade policy issues jointLy in
organizations set up for this purpose (ardat the appropriate LeveLs);
?9. ltetcomes the high-LeveL taLks first set up in 1981 betueen [eading
US government representatives and the Commission of the European
Communjties and hopes that both sides uiIt use thcm to the futL
to secure mutual agreement on and a setttement of sectorat issues
and retated potiticaI ProbIems;
30. Drah,s attention to the machinery for maintaining contacts between
the President of the Foreign Ministers meeting in politicaL cooperat'ion
and major third countries, as provided for in the 0ctober 19E1
London EPC report, and emphaticatty denands that this machinery
should be used to the futL;
31. proposes that the USA and the Community shoutd attempt to find ner
fietds for potiticat cooperation which wouLd be of mutuaL interest
and benefit and which woutd seem [ikety to inject nev Life into
the partnership, examptes here being modern technotogy and space
research and, in particu[ar, energy saving and the utitization of
aLternative energy sources;
32. DraHs attention, in this connection, to the benefits of [ong-term
transattantic research into the probLems common to the highLy deveLoped
uestern industriaLized societies and supports the initiatives taken
in this fiel.d;
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33. BeLieves that the European ParIiament, being direct[y elected to represent
the peopte of Europe is in a unique position to represent European interests
in third countries;
34. Appreciates the uork carried out over the last 12 years by its officiaL
detegation for retations rith the United States Congress and hopes that
their contacts rli[[ be improved and extended;
35. Looks forward to even more closer cooperation between the Par[iament and
Congressl
36' Instructs its del,egati; to examine the question of uhether the contacts
maintained in the intervats between the six-monthLy meetings couLd beintensified, in particular by taking steps to ;
- set up, where necessary, smaLler contact groups, uhich noul.d discuss
specific current issues and, possib[y, subnit joint proposats for
soIut i ons;
- arrange for the chairmen of the tno deLegations to keep in touch
with each other on a permanent basis yith a viey to exchanging
information on rork of intercst to both parties and passing this
infornation on to their oyn parl.iamentsi
37' Favours further efforts to ensure that issues of common interest
can be discussed by mutual arrangement in the tyo partiaments and
that agreement can be reached on joint statementsi
38' Is anxious to improve contacts with att the potitical forces in the
united states vhich ptay an important part in the formulation ofpoliticat objectives, both during the meetings nith congress and in theintervats between these meetings, with a view to providing information
on a permanent basis on the vork and viewpoints of the communities rnd
of the European parLiament itsetf;
39. Conside.rs i t necessary that :
- its detegation shoutd be abLe to visit other parts of America on the
occasion of the meeting in Uashington;
- Partiament shoutd use to the fuLL its scope for contacts yith American
offices and organizations in Europe;
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as reoards the Commission's measures to improve relations
40. SJpports the Commission in its efforts to extend and improve its contacts
in the USA;
41. Calts on the Commission to ensure that its representatives make an even
greater effort to provide ParIiament vith dir€ct infornetion on
poLitical events in the USA;
42. 13pes that the Commission ui[[ al,[oy Partiancnt to be represented in itr
oun right at its detegation in tlashington and to send individuaL officirts
therc for specific periods;
43. proposes that the Cosrmission shou[d nake it possibte for the representatives
of European groups and associations to voice their opinions more frequentty
themsetves in the USA by bringing them together uith the appropriate
American representatives, for exanpte in round tabte tatks;
44. guggcsts that the Comnrission shoutd op?n more information
offices in the USA - in addition, that'is, to the one ln Netr York - so that
tha Comnunity ccn nrake its prescncc fett rnd GxGrt ! potltlcrl, tnflucncc
in other prrts of this imncnse country uith it3 vttt rtglonrl vcrirt{ont;
45. ttelcomes the fact that the Comnission's detegation in tJashington is seen
by the American pubtic as the 'enbassy of the Conmunity' and not mere[y
of one of its institutions and therefore proposcs that the Commission shou[d
give expression to the paramount inrportance of retations betveen the
Community and the United States by consu[ting the European Partiamentrs
PotiticaL Affairs Committee in future before appointing the leader of its
delegation in ]Jashington, in the same uay as it currentty gives the
Committee of Permanent Representatives the opportunity to detiver an opinion
before proceeding rith an appointment;
e!-ressrds-lhe-EesEsres-!e-Ee-!eEen-Ev-!he-9elDsn!u-!!d-!he-EeEbsr-E!s!e!
46. C atLs on the Community as a rhote and on the individual J{ember States
to do everything in their pouer to ensure that more is knovn about
European po[icy in the United States and to increase pub[ic interest in
retations uith the European partners;
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47. Hopes that, on the basis of reciprocity of entry visas, the exchange of
peop[e and ideas rlitl. be promoted and in particutar that the younger
generation wiLl. be encouraged to take a greater interest in the United
States;
48- considers it necessary in particutar thet Amcrlcan and Europcrn oplnion
leaders in different fiel.ds and at different lcvets shouLd be given more
opportunity to meet each other and greatcr access to direct information;
49- Ca[[s, as a matter of urgency, for the official Conmunity visitors
programme (ECVP) to be extended in order to give more USmanagement
rcpresentatives the opportunity to form an accurate picture of
the Community and Europe;
50. Proposes that the European Community shoutd ayard an annuat prize for
outstanding American vork in the fieLd of AtLantic relations and
instructs its Bureau, uorking in cotl.aboretion tith the Connission,
to uork out the criteria and arrangements for ruarding ruch r prize rnd
submit detaiLs to parLiamentl
51- Instructs its President to fortrard this resoLution to the Council. and
commission of the communities, the Foreign ilinisters meeting in
Pol'iticat Cooperation, and the Congrcss and Government of the United
States of America.
-14- PE 88.473 lfin.
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BEIPtSNAI9EI-SIAIETENI
Ecg! grssnd-ge-!he-ssrreo!-s!ete-g!-Esc gpeln:Suerigen-cg!alrens
1. The retationship betveen the United States of America and the European
Community is a speciaI one. For the United States, the European Community
in many Hays represents the rhote of tilestern Europe. The strong and
fundamentaI common interests contrast uith past and present differences.
The common interests date from the birth of the United States, the
constitution of vhich took its inspiration from Europe and in turn has had
an important influence on constitutional, deveLopments in furope. Because
of the unusual continuity in the deveLopment of the United States over the
last tvo hundred years, the ideas and principtes set out in the oonstitution
are stitL vatid today and shape its society and poLitical. Life. The
United States and the Community share the same commitnent to hunan rights
and fundamentat sociat and potitical freedoms and the same principtes of
a pluraIist, democratic system of government.
The United Stated interest in its ol,n history, the yidespread concern yith
'roots' and the cultivation and promotion of the ideaLs of the first
settters have increased as a result of the sring toyards conservatism since
the 1980 eLections - the start of the Reagan administration - and greater
emphasis is ptaced on these vatues. ParadoxicaLLy, this has added to the
differences betreen America and the changed Europe of today. It has resutted
in the USA and in Europe in a certain sense of heLpl.essness since, aLthough
naturat a[[ies, h,e seem increasingLy to differ on far more points and agree
on far feuer and there is doubt as to yhether the partners can stiLL rety
on each other.
Horever, it is not on basic vatues and interests that ye have ceased to
agree, the differences Lie in our attitudes to the possibitities, timits,
methods and po[icy of the aLtiance. They have Led to a reduction in joint
action in the vortdrs troub[e spots and a retationship betyeen the atlies
on either side of the Attantic described by Henry Kissinger as a "troubted
partnership".
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President Reagan oyed his e[ection victory to the gro]rth of a certain type
of conservatism in the USA, rhich finds expression in the "moral majority".
This mora[ majority regards sociat questions as moral or retigious issues
and is correspondingty uncompromising in its attitude to them. Examptes
of this approach are thc crmpaign for the recognition of the bibticaL
theory of creation as a basis for instruction in schoots, the campaign for
the rcintroduction of rel.igious vorship in state schooIs, the stipulation
of a conservative role for romen in society and the attitude to specific
groups such as homosexua[s. These attitudes have had a decisive influence
on American policy under the Reagan administration and have in this respect
alienated it even from those potiticat forces in Europe vhich share the same
vieus on economic or defence natters.
In matters of foreign poLicy, this same attitude is reftected in a basic
feature of American poticy, uhich has alrays confticted r.ith the proverbiaI
appreciation of pragmatisn and reaIity and has to varying degrees marked
the development of Anerican foreign policyr a certain dogmatism, a
tendency to ideotogicat and abstract thought accortrpanied by a beLief in the
speciaI status and superiority of the American nation in matters of democracy
and pol.iticaL moratity. This is an attitude rhich President Reagan has
expressed on numerous occasions, for examp[e in November 1982:
'l have atyays betieved that this anointed Land uas set apart in an
uncommon xay, that a divine ptan ptaced this great continent here
betueen the oceans to be found by people fron every corner of the
earth, yho had a speciat tove of faith and frcedor,'1
The Soviet Union on the other hand is, in President Reaganrs'rords, 'the
evit empire' rhich is responsible for evit in the rortd:2
'Let us not delude oursetves. The Soviet Union underties aLt the unre3t
that is going on. If they reren't engaged in this game of dominos,
there uou[dnrt be any hot spots in the uor[d.'
This bipolar and ideotogical view of the rorld adopted by the present
United States government is at odds uith the attitudes of most restern
Europeans. These are based on past experience and potitical rea[ity,
regardless of party affitiation, and foreign poticy issues are vieyed and
assessed in their olrn particu[ar context. lt is not surprising that such
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different approaches to foreign po[icy should tead to
in practice.
The politicat purpose of this report is not, holever,
problens but to find neu possibil,ities for improving
Europe and the USA ln the interests of both parties.
Ihe-sr!sis-in-ce!e!ie!!
Seslgre!-snsee-selsecEi!e-!i!etere!-!lsses
different conctusions
to ana[yse the
relations betreen
2.
There is daity neus coverage of the economic and trade problems betueen the
United States and the Community, nith sometimes a hint of American bitterness
at this devetopment.
The'economic recovery of Europe after the rar, particularty its dynamic
grorth through the creation of the European Communities, is one of the
retsons uhy difficutties in the Atlantic A[tiance have become an important
dail,y potiticr[ feature. This is not a ner revelati6n. America's adoption
of the broken Europe of the post-Har years and its unprecedented aid to
destitute Europeans responsibte for their orn suffering uas succeeded some
time qgo by a state of rivatry betyeen tuo comparabte economic porers, but
it is only in recent years that this change has begun to have political
consequences.
The economic recovery and revivat of Europe Has atuays, it is true, the
dectared aim of American post-uar poIicy. It became increasingty ctear,
houever, that there uere atso definite disadvantages for the United States.
The Community is today a dangerous competitor for the United States, and
economic competition can sometimes lead to open confIict.
A few figures serve to indicate the extent of the risk:
The Community has become the largest trading pouer and the second [argest
economic pouer in the uortd and the United States is its most important
trade partner. The United Statesr vo[ume of trade nith the Community
increased by almost 4502 during the 1970s and far exceeds its economic
retations uith the other t'lestern European countries. The United States
is the strongest industrial pouer and the second targest trade partner in
the rorld and in 19E0 over one third of its direct investments abroad yent
into the Community, i.e. five times more than in 1958 uhen the Community
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Has set up. The United States ad the Conmunity nou compete fiercely on
third markets, as is ittustrated, for example, by the retenttess batt[e
over 36tes of agricutturaI surpluses.
Sectorat confLicts as such are to be expected in a re[ationship of free
competition. They have been a permanent feature of USA-EEC re[ations since the
'chicken uars' in the 1960s. For a [ong time they did not, horever, hanper
or threaten the re[ationship betreen Europe and America in any permahent
way. It is not the existence of such confticts betueen the USA and the
Community uhich is rorrying today, but the fact that the disputes have
become symptomatic of a troubled poLiticat and economic ctimate. This
climate of mistrust and disenchantnent acts as a hothouse in vhich disputes
over steeL and agricu[turaI exports become enlarged out of atI proportion.
Ihe-gri srs-!!-eseleuis-re!e!is!!
ln the economic sector, the deterioration in ctimate is retated first and
foremost to the United States' pe!!gU-e1_!ig!_inggleg!_Ie!99, Because of
its supreme economic pouer and the leading rote of its currency the United
States hotds the key to the recovery of the uorld economy. As Helmut Schmidt
said at the beginning of Decmeber 19E33, the rorLd has not been so dependent
economicatLy on any one pouer since the days of the Roman Empire durinE the
tife of Jesus Christ.
The tuofotd strategy adopted by the Reagan administration, aimed at reducing
taxes drasticat[y, in the tiberaI pattern, to revive the domestic economy,
thus cutting back on pubLic revenue, and at increasing defence erpenditure
in order to regain miIitary superiority, hascontributed in a large measure
to the astronomical budget deficit. This deficit syphons off foreign
capitat uhich.is urgentty needed by Europe and the Third tlorLd for their
olrn recovery. The externat consequences of domestic poticy decisions are
often ignored in the United States. The US government has repeatedty
denied or sought to minimize the existence of such a cause and effect
reLationship, for exampte at the wor[d economic summits, and c[aimed that
other factors are responsibLe for the probtems of third countries. There
are, i.t is true, different assessments, for exampte the report by
llartin FeLdstein, President Reagan's economic advir..4. The frequentLy
expressed hope that the present economic upturn in the United States uiLt
so[ve att these problems ni[[ prove to be unfounded since the nature of
the dependence nitI remain unchanged.
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At the same tine, the key role of the do[[ar in relation to atL the economic
transactions carried out in dotlars is a source of major balance of payncnts
prob[ems, particularty in the deve[oping nat.ions, which many countries-are
nor scarcely able to dea[ vith. The desperate efforts being made to avoid
a major internationaI debt crisis are a reftection of this.
Instead of treating the symptoms and confining itseIf, tith much hesitation,
to granting a fer nev toans to the Internationat trlonetary Fund, the Anerican
goverlnment must remove the root causes for uhich it is responsibte. The
I
Community must insist that the United States fuLfit the ohtigations
imposed upon it by its dominant position. lle must make c[ear that it shouLd
do this not only for moral reasons but in its oyn rea[ intcrest. Even the
strongest US economy cannot prosper today uithout a viable rortd economy
and a sound uor[d monetary system. For the Americans too, the days of
retiance on oun resources and the domestic market are over. Americrn
exports nou account for one tenth of total production and their value equats
the cost of the defence budget.S
Onty if the USA vorks together uith its partners in the trorLd to find
mutuaIty acceptabte sotutions to this basic probtem ritL the overa[[ economic
ctimate on the other side of the At[antic also improve, and the remaining
economii confticts vitI then be seen for nhat they are: timited disputes
betreen partners uhich are both normaI and reso[vabte.
It is also vitat in terms of security that Americars po[icy of high interest
rates shou[d be changed. High unemptoyment, insufficient pubLic funds for
the import of essentiaI products such as energy and food and the provision
of social assistance for the poor lead directty to poLitica[ unrest and
susceptibiLity to poLiticaI subversion, particutar[y in the chronicaLty
affected regions of the Third llortd. The Conmunity and the European parLiament
have repeatedty drarn attention to these consequen."..6 As the united Stites
exacerbates the probtems of the devetoping countries by its seLf-centred economic
poticy, it adds fue[ to the unrest uhich ultimate[y has to be qudt[ed, it woutd
seem, by mititary intervention. Centra[ America and the recent events in
Grenada are cases in point. Security pol.icy shouLd not be confined soteLy to
the creation of a defence potential. It must also include strategies to renedy
hardship and dissipate sociat tension. It must create strength and stabitity
and this cannot be achieved by ueapons a[one.
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This vieu coutd a[so become more ridespread in the United States as a
result of the planned reorganization of its foreign aid. The study group
set up by President Reagan to examine the aid progranme stated in its report
pubLished in November 1983 that econonic grouth and a rising standard of
tiving Here rsscntiaL prcconditions for the intcrnat stabitity and dcfcnce
capabitity of the devetoping countricseohd proposed an amatgamation of the
various aid programmgs together uith an rncrG6ge in funds.T thi,
reorganization rould, houever, have to be accompanied by a change in
budgetary po[icy.
Ihe-gnsis-in-!be-!!!anllg-l!!ienge
The crisis in the Atlantic Atliance is viered different[y on either side
of the Atlantic.
The main attitude in the United States is one ofirritation and disenchantmcnt
uith its European a[[ics. The United States' interest in the economic
recovery of Europe aftcr the rar r,es atrays c'tosoly bound up rith its dcslre
to en[ist a potiticatLy strong partncr rhich routd share rith it thG burden
of defending the free rortd against the threat of the Soviet Union rnd
Communi sm.
The forseeab[e problems of economic competition seemed a necessary and
appropriate price to pay to retieve the burden of responsibitity for forcign
poticy and miIitary matters. The catculation proved to be incorrect. Thirty
five years after the creation of the North At[antic A[[iance, the basle of
European security is stitL the US nuctear guarantee. The United Statcc
makes the [argest contribution in absotute terms to NATOrs defence erpenditure.
5.52 of its gross national product is spent on defcnce as compared rith 4.eU
in Francer 3.4Z in the Federal Rcpubtic of Germany, 5.6I in the United Klngdorn,
3.32 in the Netherlands and 2.EI in ltaty. (NATO Press Service, ?.12.1983,
financiaI and economic data retating to NATO defence)
A targe proportion of the American public feets particutar[y strong[yabout this
inequatity in vieu of the fact that in recent years the United Statcs
has increased its mititary commitnent to the aU.ied states vhose ci'tizens
seem increasingty inctined to agree uith those yho see in thesc defence
efforts more danger than security for Europe.8 In the American vieu,
therefore, the expenditure does not seem to be justified by the resutts. This
is resutting in defensiveness and a reneyed tendency towards iso[ationism.
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UhiLe the anendrent by Senetor lllke tiansfietd proposing i large nithdraxat
of troops froa Europe did not rqccivo naJorlty support anti rar diaeegarded
at the end of the 1960s, proposals of this nature nov stand an atarmingty
good chance of finding uide support among American politicians and the
general pubLic. Onty recentLi a Senate subcommittee voted in favour of
maintaining the American miIitary presence in Europe at its 1980 tevet,
rhich routd.mean the uithdrauaL of 151000 mititary personne[.
From the American point of vieu, the unequaL distribution of the cost of
mititary defence in the At[iance is an important reason for the crisis.
It is one of the reasons rhy Europe is dependent on the American security
guarantee, uhich is in itsetf an unheaLthy situation, as Raymond Aron has
pointed outg. It teads to arrogance and conclescensionon the one side and
irresponsibitity and opposition on the otherl0 wf,ich has a bad psychoLogicat
effect on retations. It is ridety agreed that, Hhatever the means emptoyed,
Europe must do something to assume greater responsibil.ity for its oyn
security. This view Has expressed, for examp[e, in Partiament's r6so[ution
on European Security and European poLiticat cooperationll which catled for
detcrmined efforts to drau up a European security poLicy.
It is important that the European partners shoutd make their position
clear now and take the first step forward by drawing up a European security
policy with a view to exercising greater independence in defence matters
and individuaL mi Litary power rithin the ALtiance. They wouLd thereby be
demonstrating their uiLLingness to etiminate one of the major structuraL
causes of the crisis in the Al[iance, even though it rouLd take years to
imptement this poticy in practice.
OnLy in a smaL[ minority of cases does the debate in Europe as to the
vatue and desirabiLity of the United States' miLitary commitment reftect
a generat opposition to miLitary defence and the At[iance as such. A
survey carried out among eight llestern nations in September 1982 by the
Attantic Institue shoued that a substantial majority of peopte uere in
favourofmaintaining a defence force (752 in the United Kingdom, T4l'rn
the Feder.al RepubLic and 572 in France).
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A simitar survey carried out in September 1963 shored that this attitude
had not changed atthough the ansrers to other questions indicated a shift
in vieys.
The criticism of currcnt NAT0 doctrine uhich has been expressed in the
heated debate over the stationing of the nissites referred to in the trin-
trackt{tro decision of 1979 is not, on the rhol,e, dlrccted simpl.y at the
Atliance itself. It is an expression of the uncertainty brought about by
the devetopient of arns technotogy. Europers role and situation in the
Alliance have changed; it is nor a thertre in rhfch Linited confl,icts nay
seemingty be fought and lon rather than an radvanced guard. for American
defence strategy.
The necessary basis for any alliance, the conviction that the risks are
eventy shared, has thus bcen catled into question. The uncertainties have
given rise to an impassioned debate on European gccurity interests. This
debate is nor bttter understood in the United States as a rcsuLt of thc
grorth in the freeze moveoent since 1982.
It is essential that the United States shouLd understand this problem and
take it seriousty. It must rork together rith its Europcan atLies to
deve[op a neu, mutualty acceptable strategy if thr ALLiance is to be not
onty unharmed but atso consotidated and reinforced in the long tern. The
stationing of the first nev medium-range ueapons is pertainly not a
solution to the probtem.
It must be recognized on both sides of the AtLantic that Europe's security
interests are no tonger identical to those of the USA but simpLy overtap
them in certain areas. Europers first concern must be to prevent the
outbreak of any uar on its continent rather than simpLy to Lirnit such a
h,ar. The uay in r.hich this is to be achieved and the choice of poLiticat )
and mititary strategies vitt be deternined prinaril,y on the basis of the
adversary's character, motives and nethods.
The fact that there are differences here betreen the United States and Europe
as 'a, resutt of' the differing vievs of poLiticat action exptained above is
one important reason rhy the tro partners have not adopted co0mon positions
in recent years on the crisis in East-Uest retations or on events in many
parts of the Third t{ortd.
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Ihe-drspg!e-eyet-!he-ye!se-and_!iqrgs_sI-de!en!e
The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 19?9 and its roLe
in the Potish crisis which came to the forefront tHo years Later focused
attention on the question of thc purpose and Limits of d6tente poLicy.
In the case of Afghanistan it became ctear that the opinions as to uhat
shoutd be done depended on the analysis of the probabte motives behind the
Soviet action12. uas the invasion to be regarded as an act of imperialism,
a demonstrat'ion of the desire for aggression inherent in the Communist
system to uhich the tdest had simpLy been blinded during the years of
dEtente rhich shou[d be countered by a demonstration of strength and
determination? 0r vas it more an ract of desperation than a chaLLenge,13,
an un},arranted, and therefore unjustifiab[e, step but a defensive reaction
intended to protect the Soviet nortd against IsLamic unrest rhich brought
back memories of the situation before 1914 and rouLd have been better deatt
rith by means of confidence-buiLding measures and a tessening of tension?
The fear of a threat to the Soviet system in this area tras not unfounded
since every second chitd born in the soviet union today.is a Mustir14.
But is it possibte to resolve conftict in one part of the worLd
by increasing tension in another?
A debate therefore ensued on the value and tir,rits of ti6tente within a
pol.icy of security and cooperation, not onty on the other side of the
Atlantic but aLso within the Community. The Community uLtimatety decided,
ttith the support of Partiament, to give priority to continuing the process
of d6tente in Europe. It did, it is true, accept the American view that
d6tente is an indivisibte process and, to show sotidarity xith the USA and
express protest at the invasion, it ensured that the American grain embargo
ras not circumvented. It atso expressed unanimous condemnation of the
invasion, demonstrated its sotidarity uith the Afghan peopLe by joining
uith the united States congress in decLaring 21 trtarch 1993 a day of
sympathy uith Afghanistan and ca[led for the convening of a conference
to sett[e the conf[ict. The community oid not, however, impose any
sanctions of its own on the USSR and renrained impartiaL on the question
of a boycott of the Otympic Games in Jrloscor. In view of its past history
and geo;lotiticaL situation, the Community considered that it shoutd not
voluntarity jeopardize d6tente in Europe. Since they occupy the same
continent as *he USSR,. it is of vital importance to the countries of
Europe and the Community that they shouLd achieve a modus vivendi with
this targe neighbouring state to a[[ov them to Live without constant fear
for their oun security. It is in Europe's interest to estabLish a netyork
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of economic and cultural retations vhich vitt ensure its security and is
sufficient[y strong to vithstand pressure.
Europe has tearnt that security must invotve more than mi Litary defence
capabiIity, that the process of strengthening retations begun by the CSCE
Conference is a prerequisite for an effectivc security pol.icy in Europe.
The Community and Partiament have always activety supported and ptayed
an important part in thi, ,.o..r.15. It is of economic benefit to
Europe, uhich attaches far more importance to trade uith the East than
the United States uhose exports to the state-trading countries in 19E0
accounted in aLL for 0.62 of its totat export figuresl6, and it ansuers
the wishes of those vho have benefited personatty from ddtente through
greater freedom in the East and more exchangcs and famity reunions.
D6tente has an intrinsic vatue for Europe. It is more than just a privitege
uhich can be rithdraun if the adversary misbehaves.
The American view of the situation is different. GeographicaI remoteness
alone resutts in other priorities. It is significant, as Congressman Lantos
pointed out in his vorking document for the 19th ltleeting of the tuo parLiar,rentary
Detegations, that untit 197E the US Administration had never made a
statement to Congress on American poIicy touards the Eastern European
countries for the simpte reason that such a poticy did not exist. Lantos
stated that attention had atways been focused on the Soviet Union as the
ideoLogicaL opponent. Relations betyeen the United States and the countries
of Eastern Europe rere quite secondary. The criticism expressed by
Americans such as Congressman Don Pease, uho has cal[ed for a revieu of
the American approach to d6tente, is a sign of hope that this attitude
may be changedlT.
The differing assessment of the ro[e of d6tente uithin a po[icy to secure
peace is an important reason rhy the USA and the Community have faiLed
to agree appropriate reactions to the crises in recent years. Every
crisis, from the situation in Iran in 1979 after the occupation of
the American Embassy in Tehran to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the irnposition of martia[ lau in Po[a.nd, has given rise to
the same dispute over the value and necessity of trade embargoes
and the export of rstrategicr materiaLs to the East. The most serious
uas the confIict over the constructionofthe European-Siberian gas pipeIine.
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The dispute over the policy of embargoes
The USA|s tendency to make increasing use of embargoes as a potiticat
rreapon uas bound to tead to disputes rith its European partners tho say
their long-term economic and trade relations uith the East as a cruciat
factor in thcir potiticat strategy. The situation yas further conplicated
by differences in economic interests.
The Community is incomparab[y more dependent on energy imports than the USA
and moreover obtains a dangerously high proportion of its imports from the
crisis areas of the t{iddLe East. The European-Siberian pipeLine deaL made
for diversification vhich, from the point of viet of security, ras highty
desirabte. Taken as a vhote, the LikeLy dependence on Soviet gas suppLies
was much Lorer than the Ar,rcrican f igures suggested.
Indeed, the USA painted an exeggerated picture of the dangers of the deat
and ptayed dorn the advantages vhich it routd bring to the European countries
involved, inter atia from the point of vier of safeguarding jobs.
ALL in aLL, the USA's attitude in this dispute ras characterized by a Lack
of honesty and a faiture to take account of the specific interests of jts
partners. The situation uas further exacerbated by the American Governmentrs
unprecedented action in imposing sanctions on European firms to force them
to comp[y vith the American embargo, in some cases against the express
instructions of their oun governnents. In the process, the USA tried to
make out that it knev better than the Europeans themselues where their interests
Lay and how to prbtect them. The autocrat took on the guise of guardian.
To put it btuntly, it 'punished'the fLouting of the yil.L of the poLish peopLe
by the Communi6t pob,ers in ttloscor and hlarsar by fLouting the sovereignty
of the lrlestern Europeans.
Behaviour of this kind ctearly exceeds the bounds of uhat is reasonabLe for
settting differences of opinion betveen partners. The firm, unanimous attitude
of the European countries - even those yhich yere not directty affected -
Led to the withdraua[ of the sanctions yithout any concessions on the Europearr
side. The lesson to be Learned from atl this is that one partner shouLd
not dictate terms to the other even if it uholeheartedLy disapproves of a
potitical decision it has taken. The porers which rant to see the aLtiance
ueakened are the only ones to benefit in such situations.
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It is interesting to note that the American pubtic uerr more auare of this
than the government. A Gattup po[[ conducted in the USA in August 19E2 shored
that there uere a[most as many opponents of sanctions against European firms
as supporters (48I in favour, 42I against). Llhen asked rhat damage they
thought had been caused, houever, a targe majority of the respondents mentioned
the adverse effecte on relations rith the European a[liee and ignored the
more obvious issue of the considerable econonic dlsadvantages for American
i ndust ry1 E.
The usefulness of sanctions as a means of imposing political pressure is
nou also a natter for considerable doubt in the USA. The European Community,
on the other hand, has atrays been scepticat. Partiament expressed its vieys
on the matter in detait in an oun-initiative resolution, in rhich it dreu
attention to the extremel,y Limited effectiveness of such sanctionrl9. It
has since been confirmed in its opinion by the ending of the US grain embargo
and by a velter of American reports. No-one seriously sau the end of the
hostage crisis in Tehran or the Lifting of martia[ lar in Po[and as a
consequence of Western sanctions, and the USA itsetf Lifted the grain embargo
against the USSR uithout the Soviet Union giving uay an inch.
The potitical exampte which sanctions are supposed to set had, in the eyes
of Reaganrs Administration, a[rays been a matter of considerabIe inportance
in itself and in the uttimate anatysis Lras considered to provide sufficient
justification for such measures. Houever, the yitIingness to accept substantiaL
economic disadvantages in the interests of a symboLic Aesture has timits
even in the USA. Ronatd Reagan had in fact made the lifting of the embargo
one of the main issues of his election campaign and fulfiLted this promise
in Aprit 1981 - once again vithout informing his European partners beforehand.
The economic damage sustained by the USA ras considerab[e: the embargo had
reduced its share in the USSR grain trade from 75I to 302 and other countries
had stepped in to take its pLace. Significantty, the overaU. costs of the
embargo in the form of internat governnent expenditure in support of grain
prices L,ere exactly as high as the cost incurred by the USSR in making
reptacement purchases (one thousand miLLion doLLars on both sides)20.
tJhen in January 1983 President Reagan announced the neu tau on agricuLturaL
export credits, uhich uas intended to heLp to buitd up ner Long-term suppLy
arrangements, he admitted that it wouLd take the United States not onty months
but years to re-establ.ish its reputation as a retiabLe suppLier. The conseguences
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of economic sanctions are even more serious for tlestern Europe, rhich st'pptieS
Eastern bloc countries not rith buLk agrlcutturaI goods but Uith hiEhaqUftity
industriat products. The structure of European tPade vith the Eart if hese6
on fairl.y Long-term considerations. It is the product of yiars of sentinuQui
effort in buiLding up re[ations - retations thich ctanot sirpLy be turnpd
on or off at the ftick of a sritch uhen the potitical tenpcrsture suddenty
changes.
EthicaL values and rules can and must be taken into aicolrat lhcn dseiding
on foreign poticy objectivcs and methods. In a uortd in rhich diffrrent
morat and ethical values and different reLigions and ptritosophies exist s'ide
by side,moral infLexlbiLity in the matter of foreigrt po{.icy Leads to
unpredictabiLity, loss of confidence and peritous stateaotr siiuptions-
George Uashington once said: 'No nation is to bG trus,tad frrt*t€l tihan i,t
is bound by interestt. It foLlors, then, that poLi,ticaL acfidon #ust take
as its starting point an anatysis of thc probLem concomted 'in *i'te qya qrccific
context. At certain periods, and particuLarL#or the founding fathers Of
the United States, this has besr aiiomatic in American potitics.
George tJashington in fact regarded it as a mora[ duty and a Jay,od achieving
consistency and predictabi Lity in lnternationel neLati*r21.
present-day American poLicy has moved aray fron such princiFtes fd,this
has given rise to mounting irritation and Lack of understanding among its
European partners. The East-tJest conf[ict, vhich has become an id5e fixe,
is considered to pl.ay a part in crises yhich have'baen causcd+by ooepLeteLy
different factors and nhich can onLy be understood in their oHn"Gontext.
ThisappLiesrforexamptertothelliddLe-Eastconf[ict,th€'di6slrtehotueen
South Africa and its neighbours and the crises in the count'ntGs of iCentrat
and South America.
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Differences as regards poLicies on the tttiddLe East and the Third t'lorLd
Closer coordination betveen American and European poLicies is particutarty
necessary in two areas of speciat retevance to European interests: the
IrliddLe East and the deve[opment of the Third t{ortd.
There.has never been any disagreement on the general aims of restq.ring and safe-
guarding peace in the I'liddte East and guaranteeing atL peoptes in the area the
right to exist.
The EC partners and Partiament veLcomed and supported the Camp David Agreenent
achieved, with much personaI effort,, by Jinmy Carter. Houever, they fett
it necessary to go a stip further and to recognize, in addition to Israetts
right to exist, the right of the Pa[estinian people to self-deternination
and to calI for PaLestinian representatives to be a[loued to participate
ful.ty in the peace process. In other rords, they uere going along uith
the accepted view on the unique course of history in the region and the
partiaL bLarne arising from European involvement and recognizing that it uas
vitaL for them to maintain good and friend[y relations vith a[L parties in
the confLict.
The defence of Israe['s right to exist, on the other hand, ranked foremost
among American objectives on the iliddLe East.
iloreover, the crisis in the MiddLe East l,ere considered to form part and parcel
of East-Lrlest confrontation. The Soviet Union ras thought to be rpuLting most
of the stringsr and its assumed interest in destabtitizing the area and enlarging
its oun sphere of ihfluence uas seen as one of the main causes of the confl.ict.
The situation is Less straightforuard in the eyes of the Community, rhose
position on the ttliddle-East conftict is inseparabty bound up xith its efforts
to evoLve a gtoba[ ]tlediterranean poIicy. History and geographicaL proximity
have resutted in partiouLar[y close retations betreen the l{editerranean countries
and the European Community and its ttlember States, three of yhich are
Mediterranean countries themsetves. Floreover, the European Community has
concLuded a series of association, cooperation and trade agreements covering
aLL countries in the region yith the exception of Albania and Libya and extending
to neighbouring states such as Portugal and Jordan. The basic phiLosophy
is to create poLiticat stabiLity throughout the [tediterranean area by
strengthening the economic systems of these countries. Thus, the Community
has committed itseLf to the principLe of equaLLy good, peacefut and friendLy
retations rlith aLL tvlediterranean countries, incLuding IsraeL and her adversaries.
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The joint positions set out by the EPC Foreign ilinisters in the 1980 Venice
Dectaration and elseyhere are a logicat consequence of this poLicy rhich vas
devetoped not only in the interests of the Conmunity but rtso in the interests
of the other countries concerned,
0n this basis tlre tember States of the European Community and the Community
itsetf shoutd make their oyn vatuabte contribution to the sotution of the
difficutt probtems in the ftliddLe East. In may respects they could achieve
objectives yhich the Americans, rhose invotvement is unquestionab[y necessary,
cannot achieve alone. Evidence of this can be seen in the interest in shared
European responsibiLity shorn by those direct[y concerned. The Community put
its yittingness to help to the test yhen some of its ilember States sent troops
to join the peace-keeping force in Sinai in 1982 and the multinationa[ peace-
keeping force in Lebanon in 1983. The il.l.-feel.ing nhich has arisen because of
Lack of coordlnation and consuttation betueen the commanders of the American
and Europcan contingents in the matter of the tactics to be adopted in Lebanon
shoys that, in this case, too, the USA has faiLed to recognize and accept the
Europcrns as futI partners.
Because of their cotoniaI past atmost att ilernber States maintain specia[ retations
rith nany parts of uhat ts nor the Third tlortd and Europe has become acutety
arare of its speciaL responsibil,ities as regards the fate of the Third Udrld.
These retations, yhich may have been seen as a handicap for the Europeans vhen
the countries concerned yon their independence from the coloniat pouers, are
nor paying dividends inasnruch as they are hetping to determine the course of
cooperation rith the developing nations. This became ctear to the British part-
ners at the most recent CommonreaLth Conference in Nev DeLhi in Decenber t9E322.
The same arguments appty to the French position, particutar[y in Africa.
Reatizing that successfuI deve[opnent cannot be achieved rithout assistance fron
and c[ose cooperation hrith the industriatized nations and after learning, in
some cases by bitter experience, hoy their olrn vay fortrard can be affected by
involvement in the East-tlest conftict, the countries of the Third Uor[d are
tooking to Europe for support uith an increasing sense of optimisnr.
The Community has taken up the chattenge. In particutar, European responsibiLity
for the Third t{ortd has in recent years become a centrat theme for the European
parLiament rhich, as the spokesman for a conmitted scction of pubLic opinion,
has stated its vieys uith considerabte force and unanimity on many aspects of
the probLem and given a decisive impetus to vork on the formutation of an over-
a[[ framevork for European devetopment poLi cy?3.
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The Community nor makes the largest contribution to devetopment aid in the
rorLd. Through it+troti'cy'of association uith the countries of the trlediterranean,
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific it created a pattern for forrard-Looking
cooperation betteen North and South rhich it has been continuousty buiLding
upon for more than 25 years. In this connection, it has alrays been conscious
of the fact that it is making an important contribution to safeguarding peace
in the vorld by virtue of its efforts to transfer to internationat retations
the European concept of peace, rhich is based on interdependence and the crcation
of a sense of common purpose and rhich forms the very foundation of its otn
ex i stence.
Developments in the North-South probtem have been a crntral theme of aLI recent
uortd economic summits - particutarty the one held in Cancun in 1981 - yhere
differences of opinion betueen the Europeans and their American partners have
emerged cLearty for att to see. The USA is inctined to take a selective
approach to retations vith devetoping countries. Its sense of commitnent
usually begins onty when an open crisis occurs and it suddenLy becomes ctear
that major interests of its own are at stake and mititary measures aLone uiLL
not suffice. Grenada is a very recent exa:nple of this situation. The Contmunity
had atready been giving economic aid to that tiny isLand state for many years.
It ras on[y after its mititary intervention in November 19E3 that the USA
thought again about its haLf-hearted Caribbean P[an; it yas only after the
event that it reaIized that economic neasures might have contributed to
internal stabitity; and it ]ras onty after the event that President Reagan
announced that a number of important products from Grenada and a fey other
Caribbean states wouLd be exempt from duty.
The volume of US devetopment aid is retativeLy Lor (19E0 - 5.1 thousand mitl.ion
ECU from the USA and 9 thousand mitLion ECU fron the European Community and
the Europe of the Nine). But that is not att. Because of inftation it has
dropped in recent years by ?1I in reat terms uhereas the Community's contributions
have increased by 7l in reaL terms. tloreover, Arnerican aid is concentrated
on a very sma[t number of countries uhich are important to the USA for strategic
reasons. From 1980 to 198?, for exampLer T5l of the miLitary aid and 30I
of the economic aid Hent to Israel, Egypt and countries uith Us mititary bases
such as Spain, Turkey, the PhiLippines, south Korea and portugat25. This
ptaces the philosophy behind the USAis current devetopment poticy in a very
reveaIing Light.
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The iDaot of this phitosophy is intensified by the fact that the USA, udcr
the Reagan A&inistration, rants to use its liberal internat poticy forulae
for ecorpric recovery to prorote'econoric progress and an increlsc in thc
stardard of tiving in the lhird tlorld, evcn though thc fundarm,tet cottditims
there arc corptetety different. If the USA and the European Cormity coutd
bring their differing idcas into line rith each other this vortd not ctty
hel.p considerabty in bringing about an understanding betueen the tro parties
on practical individual. issues but coutd atso provide an irportant basis for
joint lGasures yhich, by their vcry naturc, routd increase their sotidarity.
In his speech in .ilice in October 1981 at a conference on the future of Atlantic
retations President Thorn singl.ed out such action as a possibte fruitfut fiel.d
fo,r '. active and constructive cooperation in vhich both partners coutd use
their strength and econoric resources for the practical safcguardiqg of peace.
This idea shouLd be taken up again-
3. Conctusions - a ner starting point for Atlantic relations
0n close inspection it becores apparent that the individuaL areas of conftict
and their nunerous nanifestations can in fact be resotved into a fcv basic
issues. The causes' can be divided into those arising fron errors and
shortcooings on the European side and those vhich can be taid at the USArs
door. tn many cases the tatter are opent.i criticized by targe mimrities yithin
Anerica' for rhom they are a cause for concern. No cause for dispute is so
basic that it cannot be eLirninated or at least turned to good account in the
form of successfuL and coordinated action by adopting a ner starting point,
by frank disctrssions and by an honest attenpt to understand the motivcs and
interests of the other side.
This conctusion is one yhich the European Par[ianent vould be justified in
cirauing, in particutar from its tyetve years of direct experience in inter-
par[iamentary exchanges betreen the US delegation and its orrn official, delegation
for re[ations rith the US Congress. For many years it has had the opportunity
of hotding taLks uith representatives of various poLiticaI outtooks and has
observed that regular exchanges of information and discussions can prooote
mutuaI understanding, etininate misconceptions and ctear the ray for joint
activities. In this connection, attention shouLd be drarn to such exanptes
as the Afghanistan Day, the preparation of measures for tackting the drug
probLern and initial noves to deaL yith the extrenety controversiat topic of
the Vredel.ing Directive. This inportant rork is described in nore detaiI
in the annex to tlfe present report.
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The centraL objective is to co$ine the desire to gain an insight into current
probters rith the dcteminrtion to find joint sotutions on the besis of
pertncrrhlp rnd thr cmon gromd brtrotn tho tro rldrl rhleh lr lutt e!
trtm!'lva nor ts lt rvrr rtt.
The astonishing retutts of the potL conducted by the Attantic Institute in
Septenber 1983 confirred the need for progress in this fietd. Indeed, the
figures for peopte ansrerlhg tyast to the.question of rhether the security
of the lest rested upon cooperation betveen lestern Europc and the USA rcrc
tover than in 1982 ln aLL of the ierber States yhich participated in the pol.t
rith the erception of thc United Kingdor, rhere they renained the sane.
The differencc ras particutarly narked in the FederaI RepubLic of Gernany,
rhere the figures fe[[ fror 54I to 34U. Thc percentage of respondents ansrcring
'yts' to thc question vhether thcy routd prefer to see greater contacts and
diatogue rith the Soviet Union rose by corparison yith 1962 in at[ ]lenber
States ulth thc exception of the Nethertands, rhere there uas a sratI drop.
The most nrarked differenct ras in the United Kingdon (362 in 19E3 as opposcd
to 197 in 19E2). In the United States, on the other hand, more respondents
ansvered t'16sr to both qucstlons than in the previous year. Forty per cent
vere in favour of norc cooperation betreen the USA and ttestern Europe
(36t in 198?ri end 402 vere atso in favour of npre c.ooperation uith the Soviet
Union (as opposed to 252 in 1982). This last figure is the second highest
of the resutts obtained in any of the countries participating in the potl
(after the FederaL RepubLic of Germany yith 422)26.
Comparison of the vievs on these tro questions reveats an increased interest
in more batanced relations betveen the llestern partners and in inrproved retations
yith the Soviet Union.
It is particutar[y encouraging that this trend is also apparent among Ancrlcans,
who, on this centrat issue, have moved considerably ctoSer to the rnajority
opinion in Europe.
The aLtiance vould benefit from a revival of the notion of an Attantic
partnership based on equatity first put forrard, rith a sense of vision and
responsibitity, by President Kennedy at the beginning of the Sixties. The
Community is better equipped nor than it yas then to add reight to the European
side of such a relationship. A partnership of this kind adnittedLy has to
take account of the fact that corplete equatity does not exist in terns of
economic or miIitary strength, but it shoutd neverthetess be based on the
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principLe of equaLity - rlith due regard to speciaL individuaI responsibiLities
and consistent mutuat exchanges of information, consuItation and agreement
on aIL important issues and in particular on political measures shoutd forn
part and parcel of its basic tenets. References to the common ground rhich
stiLL exists betyeen the tyo sides - and these are frequentLy only rhetorical -
are not sufficient. The partnership must actuat[y operate and be put to the
test every day.
4. [teasures for the maintenance and improvement of re[ations
ileasures for the maintenance and improvement of retations must be broadLy
based and must take account of a number of speciaL factors relevant to the
USA's externaL relations in generat and its reLations vith the Community in
particuLar.
4.1. Account shoutd be taken of the vide variety of opinions and interests
in the USA and the considerabte inftuence uhich this has on the formutation
of officiaL US poLjcy. It is important not onLy to keep up the essential
contacts with the officiat offices in tlashington but aLso to maintain contacts
uith the most important s6slsnric, sociat and politicaL opinion leaders. This appLies
both to Commission contacts and to European Par[iamcnt contacts. In vietr
of the extent to uhich American interests are represented in Europe, such
activities need not be confined to trips to the USA and meetings there but
can in fact be usefulLy carried out at home as rett, as is demonstrated by
the European Partiament's tong-standing re[ations with the American Chambers
of Commerce here.
4.?. Account must be taken of the fact that the degree of information and
open-mindedness on European issues varies consdierabLy betveen the more
Europe-oriented East coast of the USA and the mid-tJest or the states on the
West coast. The majority of'Antericans today Live Uest of the llississippi,
i.e. in those parts of Artrerica furtirest auay from Europ6.
Last but not Least, the vietnam var has made people very much more a]rare
of Americars Pacific interests. President Reagan's trip to Asia in 1983 made
it ctear that interest in Japan and ASEAN is atready running a cLose second
to interests in Europe. President Reagan's dectaration [ast year in Tokyo -
no relationship betueen two countries is nore important for uorLd peace and
prosperity than the retationship between the USA and J 
"p"n?l - stands in stark
contrast to the stereotyped affirmations that Europe is Americars most important
aLLy.
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13. Externat rclations in thc USA shot e considcrlbl,c tact of cmtinuity.
This ir .ttribut.ble, intcr rtir, to certtin sgccific fcrtures of thc pol,itictt
3y3tc. in thet country. The Constitutlon cmfcrl on Congrarr r ujor rotc
ln fortign rctrtions. lNerberl of thc HorrsG of flcprcscnt.tlvGs trc cLcstcd
for pcrlodr of mly tro yt.r3; thry lrr thrrcforo lrbJcct to rubrtmtlrl
Drcssurc fron locrt rnd rcAionrt lnttrcrt groupt.
\
Sincc to ltI lntcntc tnd purpo3Gs thGrG ll no prr!.nGnt Civit Servicc
,ti.tt voutd rorl loyrl,ty for a govGrmnt forrod fror.nothGr potltictt
plrty, r chrnge in thr ruting rrjority fottoring Frcsidcntlrl, ctcctions
traditionrtty tctds t'o the rcptrcercnt of rl,t irporttnt govcrnrcnt
officiats. Ihcn Prcsldent lcrgcn took up officc sir thousrnd officiats
Lcft thrir desks tnd vcnt ovrr to privrtc lndurtry or scicncc, oftcn trking
vith thcn iBport.nt inforartion rnd crpcrirncc rhich onty thcy posscrscd.
This is rnothcr frctor rhich contributG3 to thc trel ol contlnulty ln
Ancrictn Foreign Potlcy rnd rvln mlar lt difficuLt lor thc Eurogotn
p.rtncrt to r.inttln plrnrnent cont.ctS rlth thc right pcogta ln lrrhlngton.
!r!. The situation ls furthcr compticttsd by thc Arcricrn tcndcncy torards
'onc-i3tuc potiticar - thc tendency to conccntratr on onG probtcr at ! tin!
rnd to syctp rtl othcr issucs undrr tha clrpGt untit r crisis oncc again
brings then to th? attlntion. Although thc Cootunity is not tilcty to hit
thc heedLincs, it rust cndcavour to Gn3urc th.t lt it rtyrys r fcctor to bc
tekcn into .ccount ln Aacricrn potlticr .rd th.t intcrctt ln thr grrtncrrhip
is kcpt ativc,
tinatty, thc trrnsition fron thG grnlration yhich foundcd the al,l,irnec
thc comnunity is ttnost coaptctc on both sidcs of thc Atttntic. Thc
genrr.tion of lcadcrs has bccn cc3t in r diffcrcnt routd.
The nain distinguishing fcaturc of thc torth Attrntic ettiance, yhich forns
the basis of retations betvcrn the Unitcd St.tca rnd thc Connunity, lr thrt
its founding frthcrs htd ctt shared thc crpcricncc ot re.2E. Thus, thc
rttiance uas not sirpty foundcd on a cotd cel,cul,ation of intcrcsts; it was
atso buoycd-up by inner dedication and pcrsonat fccting. As has rightty bcen
pointed out?g, rc c.n rrst.ssurcd that the ncr gGncr.tion ritl cl,carty
rcati:c th.t it ir'vitetty irport.nt to continuc rith the rLlimcc end yiu,
.ct tccordingty; horcvQr, this rtonc ritt not crGltG thc 3.rc bris of
shercd crpcricncc on rhich thr 3trcngth rnd rtrbittty of thr al,lltnco yts
originetty founded.
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The process of change cannot be haLted. If the community recognizes
this in aLL its significance it vitL be abte, by active measures, to hetp
to ensure that ner common ground is created and that re[ations betueen
the USA and tlestern Europe are placed on a ney footing rhich is adapted to
change and therefore more soundty based.
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ANNEX II
lioTloil toR A RESoLUTIoI{ (DOCUilENT 1-6gEtii)
tebLed by ir CRqrX, ir il0TEitB00i, ir von HASSEL urd
Ilr vrn AERSSET{ on brhrtf of tho Europorn pcopterr
Prrty
rith rcquG3t for an carly yotr pursurnt to
RuLc l?(5) of thr RuLrr of procodurc,
,,
i
,'to rlnd up the drbttc on Orul eucttlonr
Docri i-616t62 rnd i-61?/62
on thc nccd to irnprovc thG structu?rr for thc diel,ogue
brtuorn th. Europcln comnunlty rnd tha unitad strtcr
Ihs-Esseese!-ear!ieoeu!,
1.
atere that an increase in the number of sectoraL disputes betreen the
European Comnunity and the United Stetcs coutd threaten lrestern sotidarity,
convinced that the coirnon intcrests that bind Americans and Europeans on
either slde of tht Attantic 
.youtd ba bettcr understood rnd misundcrstandings
overcone if the institutionat Iinks and communicatlons structurer bctuccn
thc tro partrurs rere improvcd and strcngthened,
desirous, yith this in mind, of making ful.[ use of the instrument it
possessts in the fOrn of the DeLegrtion from the Eruopean ParIiaemnt for
rclations rith the Un{tcd Statcs Congrcss,
CaLLs on the CounciI of l{inisters meeting in poLiticat cooperation tbfacititrte frequent meetings rith thc Amerioan Secretary of State for
the regular considcration of the coomon aspGcts of rctations bctrccn
America rnd Europc in the poLiticat, tconomic, cmcrciaI and securlty
f iel.ds;
Invites thc Commission to intcnsify thc relevant contacts rith the
rcprescntativcs of thc Unitcd Statcs rdrninistration;
Suggests that tuo promincnt indcpcndcnt pcrsonatitics be appointed,
ono by thc Unlted Statrs and thc othGr by thc Coilnunity, to drar up at
tn cerLy drtc o [ist of thc varlous conmcrcirl and ilonetery problems and
to ptrce thcn in rn ordor of priority. Such a tist routd provide an
indcpcndcnt asscssment of the probtcns to be solved so that the teadGrs
of the Community and of the Unitcd Strtcs may opan ncgotiations in opositive frame of mind;
?.
5.
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4. Instructs its Bureau to improve thc opcration of the DctcAation for
retrtions rith the US Congrcss, flrstty by enabting the rapporteur for
thc apppoBrirtc connittee to servc on the detcgation lhcncver a specific
trclinicrt sr.rbject is entcred on tho agenda for onc of .thc bi-annurt iqtatingr batreen thc dcLegations.
- and secondty by appointing tro or thrcc of its ac*ers, sctectsd for .
thsir specific abititics, to visit the Unttcd States in the pcriod
bctrecn the bi-annuat mcetings in ordcr to rneet thcir Alcrican
coqrtcrprrts and discuss rith thm thc iost scnsitlvc, pr*rssing fiU
exorptionatty serlouc itaurc;
I;rttructs its Prcei.dent to fomrd thll rccol,utlot to thc forcign
mi6lsters mecting:;fg EPC rnd to tm Gmiission.
i l i"1;t :.
5.
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ANNEX III
I{OTIOI FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUNEilT 1-949/E3)
ttbLed by ilr Lconidas KYRK0S
pursuant to Rul,t 4? of the Rutts of. Proccdure
on thE tanding of US mi [itary forces in Grenada
Thc Curopean ParLimcnt,
l. qmeornld pt; tlrc Lpn{ing of Ps:.r}\itery fOneg ,i* 6rcntde, rgllnst
'drt rtJlrcr br ftr govmrnrat'artd+*o&tti
B. 
,conridcrtng thrt this rct i,r r crudc viotrtlon ol thc principtc of
lctpcst for thc gorrCtuignlt ot *ctrfltatc ard."ibf ,non-intGrvrntion
'$r: ftl,firttr;$, .5-ff r$s,
G. contcious ol thc dangcr of"ttrts pr.cticc bcing lrtandcd to othcr
countricr in CcntraI Aneric! or ccuffng lxtrcnCtri lcutc intGrn.tionrl.
.corpt i crt.lonr- rc'{lrrt . pcrGr ritt- b+ -cndrngcrcd;
D. rhereas Grenrdo is a mcrnbcr of the ACP group of countries,
1. Condenns the Amcrican Govcrnicntrs dccision;
2. GrLtg for thc inrediate tithdrurt of thc intlrvrntion force;
J. Dcnands rcspect for the principl,c of non-intcrvcntion;
4. Supports thc search for r pcrccful outcorc to thc orisis in Centrrt
Anrric., on tho brsig of the noves by thc Contrdorr group of
-\
countftCr:
5. Instructt thc Prcrident of thc Europcan Partimctt to forrard this
rrsotut{bft tb thC govcrntnts Ol thc'Ilct,"r gtlttt, tlu Prccidcnt
of the USA end thc Sccretrry-Gentrrl of thc tfrl.
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: (Rutc 101 of thr Rutcs of procedurc)
*"'"
of the Gomlttoc on Agrlcutture
Draftsman: ilr Giuseppc VITALE
0n 1E January 1983, thc Comittee on Agricutture appointcd lrlr VitaLG
draftlnan.
It considered the draft opinion at, its meetings of 26121 liay,
12113 Ju[y and 20121 Septcdcr 1983.
At thG lrtter neeting, thc conerlttoc odopted the draft opinlon by
14 votss in frvour rith E abstentlona.
The fotloring took part in the vote: trlr CURRY, chairnan; l{r CoLLESELLI,
vice-chairman; tlr VITALE, draftsnan; ilr.BAfiBAGLI (deputlzing for lir LIGIOS),
I4r CLINTON, IIr EYRAUD, IIIr GATTO, Iir HELf,S, i|r KALOYAIIIIIS, iIrS LE ROUX
(deputizing for tlr }IAFFRE-BAUGE), tir ilAHER, lrlr iIARTM (deputizing for
Itlr PRAi{CHERE), llrs S. IIIARTIN, ir llAf,CK, Itlr llcCARTIl{ (deputizing for ltr pERTENS),
t'lr ttl0UCHEL, ilr PAPAPIETRO, l{rs PAUIIELY}I (deputizing for ttr DELATTE), }tr PROVAN,
ils QUIN, Itlr STELLA (deputizing for fir DIAtrtA) and ttr THlREru.
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I. IT{TRODUCTION
------------
1.1 During 1982,
on tha poLittcrl
St.tG3 of lnrricr
To assist rith
AgricuIture decldcd
aspccts of rclrtions
Ithc PoLlticat Affrirs Gomrnittec drcu up dn interin report
tspccts of rctetions bct*cen the Community and the United(Doc. 1-300/82 - Repportcur: ltrs GREDAL).
the drafting of the final. report, the Coiuaittee on
to dcLivcr an opinion covering the por.iticar. anci economic
botrrcn thc tuo countrics in the agricul.turtt sector.
In the cour3c of this r.ast yea?, relations betrern thc EuroF,ean
connrunity end thc Unltcd stetes in the agricutturat sector have been charactcrised
by sevcrc tcnlion and, unlcss sotutions can be found in the short terfi to the
current conftict, thcre is a drngcr of ctashes on agricutturat marhets, the
conscquences of rlich could be much more scrious than the difficuLties
erpcricnccd in thr rtmL trctot.
t'2 Rrtltionr betvaGn tht EEC and uSA havc dcteriorated s.incc president
Rcagan instructed hir A&rinistrrtion to dcvetop the gotentiel. offered by tfre
axportttlon of rgricuIturaI produce for corrGcting Anerica,s gtobat tradebalancc' In ct{rct, the Presidcntrs proposal, airns to renovc aLt the obstactes
rhich rre likcty to tinit Arnerican exports. The f i rst victin of srrch apoLtcy is cl,eerl.y going to be the Conmunity, a rnajor inporter of a3ricutturatproduce, GspGGittty rince lt too is frcrd vith thc increasingl,y urgcnt probtem
of finding !n outtot for its orn products on foroign aarkets . ,
1'3 This documcnt outIines the devetopmGnt of the agricultural sector in the
unitcd statcs, draring conparisons uith the euotution.f the sectcr in iheEEC' It atso examines the rel,ations betvcen the tro paftnecs in the agricutturaI
sector to arrivc at r ful,ter understancJing of Arnerican grievnnces.rnd thc EEc
responsc' In conctusion, it puts forvard a numbcr of proposal,s to help resol,ve
thc prcsent conltict rnd prevGnt ncu difficutties fron arising.
*
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2.1 Approrimatel,y 3.4I of the rorking popul'ation in the United States'
i.e. 3.g nittiOn pCOpte., arc currcntLy enptoyed in the agricutturaI sector'
rhich"ie nadc up of about 2.5 niLLion entQrprises, each of uhich has an
averagc surlrcc rrfs of 168 hectares. uhitc thc number of cnterprises
contlnucs to fatt, tha average sufftce area of those uhich renain is tending
to increase. The 15rd)0 largest cnterpriseS account for iust under a quafter
of theltoa.t number, but prdduce over a third of the goods offered for sate'
A high degree of dficicncy is a characteristic feature of this
structuree givCn that the enterprists ar€ predominant[y extensive in
charactcr and arCchanized to a large extAnt. However, this does not necessarity
resutt in an exceptioneluLy high yieLd per hectare' For instance, in the case
of cereats intcndcd for hunrn consufiPtion, such as uheatr rY€ and rice,
production per hecttrc oftcn fail's to match European I'cVeLs, rhi[e in the case
of soya and cereal,r used in zootechnics, such as maize, oats and barley,
yietds are highcr than in Europc. comparative figures on community and US
agricuttura lrQ givcn in Anhcx I'
?.? The American agricuLturaL sector began to disptay marked symptors of
crisis frorn 1929 onyards. Despite the exceptionatLy favourab[e ctimatic
conditions, thc considerabl,e efforts by American farmerS and the nassive aid
provided undcr. govGrnnent agricutturaI poticy, difficul'ties emerged uhich
initiau.y affected thc cercats, niLk and cheese 3ectors and subsequentty
extended to other scctors.
The record harvests of 19E0/81 and 1981/E2 I'ed to a messive buitd-up
in stocks: American cereat reserves in 1981/82 rose by ?82 against 197918O
(an increase of 5lrO0OrO0O tonncs)) in the same period, butter reserves
recorded an incrcase of 6?I, reaching 202,000 tonnes, uhite poudered mil'k
rcserves rose by 1231t to ettain 554 tonnel'
The reason for thc current difficuLties of American farmers have been
sought in factors both internal and externat to the United States, rhich can
be sumrned uP as fotlous:
./'
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- fol,torying r Lbng Dcrlod of'cxpansiorv ln internatibnot trade in ggricutturaI
prodectr, durlng rhich thc EEc, but avm oorc 80 the tnitGd states,
incr?lrcd ltr GPOrtb, l9E? sai . dtcUnc in the uatue aid, in the case of
mrc productr, tht volurc of agricultltrat lrports, cluscd partLy by a
- thc irprovlng copctitivQnc3s of an .incrtasing nnber of countries in tht
agrtcutturat scctor, EraziL and Argentina, rhich havc broken the American
mnopoLy of thl toyl lrkct, cortd bc tited as crrarptes in this respect.
Inleror!-!*tscr:
- a sharp lncrcur ln costr oring to thc rire in thc prlces of oiL and
fcrtltizcrr rnd thc lncrcrlcd coEt of lorroring;
- thc crcatiotl of urptutGr rhich Erl increasingl.y difficul.t to dispose of;
- the risc in thr yr.tuc of thc do,l,Lar as e resutt of
intcrcst rltcs rdoptrd by the Unitad States, yith
US Sxports;
the pol.icy of high
the consequcnt sLurnp in
- th. cfblrgo ffi o{portr to the Soyict Union inposed in Jqnuary 19g0.
r r r. 
^EEISUIUI!^I_!EIgE_EF$,EE!-IUE_EESJUg_rEE-U!4
3.1 American production is targety cxport-oriented (see Ar,ncx) anct the EEC,
vhich takes uo 2$l of total 
€xport,se is the bi.ggest narket for the united
states, al.though thc proportlon of American exports absorbed by the EEC has
been falting in ?cccnt ycrrs. Soye and naite account for about hal,f of
American Gxports to the EEC. Cooaunity ioports of agricuttural produce from
the USA havc increesed at crtrerel,y high rates since 1g5g, reaching grg3g m ECu
in'!9E2. The Gonnunity.s agricutturat trade deficit yith the usA has thus
continucd to ridcn, rmving froa il,t00,009,000 in l96E to t5,90O,00O,0OO
in 1979, and topped 37ro0oro00rooo in igat, even though it subsequentty fer.t
back in 19E2.
As the tabtc in trrncr II shgus, exports of agricuttural produce are on
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the incrcas! in both thc united statcs and the EEG, but it can atso be
seen th.t ih thc pcrlod fron 1975 to 19E1 Colrunitv Glportt ingreasefl nore
rapidLy thrn Arcrlcln rlportr'
Thc dcvctoprGnt ol EtG+ls lgrlcuttural trld+ ir detaitcd in Anacx III'
3.2 In thelr Lttt yaa?r1 thc Goolrunity his recorded notabte' resutts in the
area of produCtion, ln terns of both qutntidy rnd productivityi it has
achicved sctf-rufffe{cncy - md in sooe casQs cxcceded it bJ a vide margin -
in a certaln nurbcr of'groducts, ruch as dairy'products2 sugar' bartey and
rheat
Thit irnprovtd productluc crpacity is reflectcd in the EEC's increased share
intheUorl'dnrrkct,forlnrtrnc:inthcfotlouingproducts:
lhltg- g!-E!-19-10-tgttiLslgg!! g-!I ) s
ltz! ugq 1291
Sugar
uheat and flor
tlhoLc ni tk Pordcr
a
ButtGr and buttcrolt
t4
7.3
6?.4'
46.4
16.2
13.2
72.9
63.2 ,
18.5
14
' 76.1
,4.1
During thc 3aCIG pcriod, horever, the EEC's depcndencc grel in respect of other
products, espcciaLLy animat fecding-sttiffs, such as soya, corn gtuten feed
and cassava. ior Craop[e, Comnunity irnports of corn gtuten feed from the USt
increased from 0.7 tonnes in 19?4 to 2.3 !l'tofrncs in 19E0: 941 of American
production is erPorted to EuroPe'
5.3 The community her thus not 3ubstantiaLLy increased its share in uortd
exports of 
. 
agriCuttural. producc'as a uhote' The trro most irnportant concIusions
to emergG fror thc trbtc in Anncx 4 are:
- that the EEC has gredurLty reduced its pefctntag€ share of total' uortd
imports, a {act rhich can to some extent be exptaincd by the increase in
dernand for foodstuffs in othcr countries
- that the contractions of the uorld narket in 19E1 had a bigger impact on
the usA than on the EEC. In fact, uorLd trade in agricutturat produce
dbcreased in valuc.in thtt yqaf, fa.tt,irlg f ron'i245rEggr000r000 to \
s244,1O010001000.
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a:l 'SunOort lGrsurcs for egricutture in the United States are nany and
' 
,*rri"A, cdprising e rhotc rangG of statutory instrurents to be eaptoyed in
.ertct of ncc.csstty. Thesc inctudc rcasurrs to uaintain prices on tha interna[
rarletr. rhich in ccrtein scctors (in particutar ritk and checse products)
.rG tore corpnchcnsivc than their EEC equivatent; provision is'aLso nade for
lfort rcstrictions, ia.surcs to Gncourage exports and for various other forms
of aid.
4.2 The internal price raintenance neasures are financed by the Conmodity
Crodit Gorporation: Thc GCG is orned and run by the Government. It vas set
up to stebitizc thc [cvc[ of price maintenance and to safeguard incomes and
tgricutturat priceg. Its purpose is to guarnatee a sufficient suppLy of
agricutturat produce. Thc lcasurts can take the forn of loans, transfeis of
ouncmhip, purchesct, dircct payrants or a conbination of ail, the6e methods.
Price traintcnancc G€t3urcs arG provided or granted 'in respect of most
.agricutturat product3: rheat, naize, groundnut, rice, tobacco, uool (normaI
or noha.lr), connon short-stapte or ertra tong-stapte cotton, honey, bartey,
oat3, ryG, sorghurn, nitk rnd chcege products, lLax, soya seeds, resins and
sugar bect end c!nc.
4.3 The United Statrs has atso adopted a series of measures to protect its
internaI nrarket from imports. The measures estabtished are either generat,
to be apptied to imports as a rhote, or specific provisions concerning tht-'
importation of agricuttural products for uhich the United States is in
deficit, such as beef, veat and sugar, or in trhich it is tess coi'!':petitive,
as in the case of mitk and Cheese products.
To protect Arncrican entcrprises, a procedure exists uhich attoys them,
in cases rhere they havc denonstrabty suffered prejudice as a resutt of the
inportation of given products at prices beLou that hetd to be rfair', to
cotl.ect countcrvaiIing charges on the imoorted goods. Certain standards have
a'restrictive effcct, such as those appl.ied to mil.k and cheese products,
pouttryncat, beef and veal for reasons of heatth protection.
Uithin the framcyork of thc GATT, the United States requested from the
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outsct - and obtaincd - quantitativc rcstriGtions on irports through the
introduction of rhet is knoln as the 'uaiver' for a large number of agricutturat
product3. Thesc tiritations, in the sugar sector for instancc, take the
forn Ol ilpOrt quotaS fOr each Glporting country; no quot'' has betn assigne''!
to thc EEC. Anothcr Gr.agtc Can be found in the inposition of an inport [evy,
as in thc Gase of Comunity rotaSscs, Ihereas Aoerican notasSes i;pOrted into
the EEC is mt Liabtc to any charge of this kind'
4.4 The protcction end organization of the Anerican agricutturat market is
underpinned by a yhote scries of tegaL instruments and regutations aime( at
supporting Aaerican Grport poticy. .These inctude:
- the oassivc prcscnca abroad of conaercial, advisers: agricutturaI offices
have been sGt up in rorc than 70 countries vith the task of pubLicizing
American Prodrctr;
- the activitiGs of rarkct dcvetopmeat cooperators, i'e' private companies
reprcsenting tht intcrcsts of producers and traders in a given product or
sector. The CoOpC?atOr3 rork in ctose contact vith the Governnent;
- food aid geared to the nceds of exportation, estahLished in the Ag:^icu[turaI
' Trade and Development and Assistance Act (1954), a lar vhich had the aim of
disposing of surptuses and using them to promote the devetopment of
setected rountries. This tax, PL 480, has a[so enabLed the r'lnited States
to setL off products in given developing countries in the guise of focd
aid, but under such conditions that rhe aid may be regarded as tantancunt
to an indirCct export Subsidy, and this has in turn 5lroctuced unfavourabte
consequences for other exporting countries. The markets into uhich the fcod
aid uas channettcd then devetoped gradual,Ly to the point of becoming estabLished
comnercial' markcts for the United States;
- American farmers can atso obtain export credits from the Ccmrnodity credit
Corporation referred to above. One recent resutt of this expor"t of{ensive'
spearheaded by the c.c,c., can be seen in thc'agreeiaent conctudec by thst
body uith thc Egyptian Government Authority for Suppty Cornmodities (GASC).
This agrcement guarantecs the suppty of a miLtion tonnes of uheat flour betueen
1 itarch 19E3 and 30 ApriL 1984, as an addition to the quantities imported
under the PL 4E0 progrannc. The price ui[t vary betueen 5150 ano $160 per tonne,
PE EE.473ltin.
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deprndinB otr the nethod of tinanclng andthc 'forr'r. of cred'it oecurity 
chosen'
bythcGAEC.ThGtestgatcsofEEGfl,ourtoEgyptueiit,madg,oith!prite
ot St?9 Pcr tonne.
,nr"ro*,eeion hrr l,odged an lPo.Gat under the GATT against the 
ptan to export
yheatftour to Egypt, rcgarded by ttra Community ts a traditionat' outtct;
.Gxportiltionisalgoprotectedbysection30tofthelg?4TrarJeAct,which
aLtows for economic retaIiatory sction aga{nst any country rhich enters
into competition cither rith Amerlcan exports or tlith Americon products
on AncricBn territorY;
- thc Reagan Administration subsequentLy ptaced emphasis on ttre 
export of
agricuIturaLproduct5.The1981t.e9.isIationonagricuIturestipuIates
that betueen $175r00OrOO0 and 3190'000'OOO of the C'C'C' budget be
.rssignerltoplo0otingtheGxportofagricuttrrr;rIproduce.tnaddition,a
new credlt instrumcnt has becn created, the AgricuLtural' Export credit
Revolving tund, chich has thc function of promoting the export of agricuttu-rat
productsi
- to concl.ude this incomplete Iist of American provisicn5,mention shoutd be
madeoftheGffortsbytheunitedStatesu'ithintheGATTtoremovethe
tariffandnon-tariffbarrierstoitsprincipatmarkets,andofthe
conctusion of a rhoLe series of bitateraI agreements' rhich have opE'ned up
ner marekts, such as China and the Soviet Union' to A;nerican 
products'
v. a-ggEElBllgN-qEIUE g!-qIBEgI-l!g9u: -luB?aBI-!!-IEE-EEq-aU9-Iils-rr!l
5.1 0uing tO the enormous dif terences in agrrcuLturaI Strutture/ corrc; I t'"rr']t
of production, the economic and industriat context, the strength o{ the dottar
onforeignmarketsrthebankingsystem'transportstructuru'setc"itis
extremety difficuLt to compare the reaI internat prices of agricuLturat
produEts in the united states and the EEC, uhich HOuLd be necessary in order
to caLcutatc the tevel' of incone support for farmers'
SimitarLy, any comparison betyeen commttnity pr"iGes ano norLd prices ilust be
approached rrith caution, since the Horl.d price is di rect [y inf luence'd h'y the
poticy fottoned in the major.*po.{inE countrits, especiatLy the United
states, and the support rhich they Erant. Neverthetess it c8n be cLaimed -
and this is a poLiticaL fact of the greatest Gonsequence - that Conrmunity
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pri.cesforcercats,thoughrcnainingmarkedtyhigher,haveinrecent,yearS
becn tcnding to drar ctoser to uortd prices, rhiLe 
the same phenomenon
cannotbcdctcctcdinthecascofotherproducts,asthefol'l.owingtable
shoHs:
geEss!!!r-el! gss 
-!9-E![ss!!sg!9
e!-uec!e-el!seE
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Source: Ep - Dircctorate-GeneraI for Research and Documentation 
(PE 75'4L5)
S.2Acomparisionofpubticexpenditureismoresuitabtefcrcotculating
the Levet of support granted to agricuLture' The totat agricrl"'turat 
budget
of the United Statcs (USA Federat Budget) -.inc[uding financiat assrstance,
toans, guarantees, aid in kind, Ctc. - a]nounts to $45,000,000,000 
for 1983.
The cornmission of thc Europcan cornnunities has catcuLated pubLic erpenditure'
by the comnunity and the trtember states, on community agricult':re 
for the
sameycaratapproxirnateIyt55,ooo,ooo,o00.DirectincomeSupp'o.tforthe
sameycartotats$13r8O0rOO0'OOOintheEEC(EAGGiGuaranteeSection=
14,087 m ECU) and 321r1OOrO0O'000 in the USA'
The tabte in Annex v, rhich expresses the LeveL of.rgricuLtura[ support in
terms of various economic indicators - such as production' tand under 
cuLtivation'
numb€rofparsonsemployed,etc.,invitesthefotLouingconctusions:
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- us ail has lncrcased at en ertremer.y high rate, esptcial.ty since 1g01;
- co;parcd in terns of GDP and the area under cuttiration, the tevet of
support granted by the usA is a tong ray betov the community tevet;
horcvcr, in 1982, US aid, as a p?rcentage o{ ogricu[tural prorjuctiorr, ras
for thc first tlma onty stightty touer than community aid;
- on thc othcr side, uhen expressed in terns of the nunrber of persons
enpl,oyed in the sector, and of the population in generat, it is the
cofimunity aid vhich emerges as far louer than the us aid.
NevcrthcIess, despitc these substantiaI provisiorg for subsrdization,
agriculturaI incomc in the United States is decl.ining rapidty. Net income
fetL ln 1980 from $251000,000,000 to $20,000,000,000, and the Agricutture
Oepartment cstimltcl thrt it coul.d fail. betotr sl6,000,000,000 in 19gj.
vI. 9!IIi--Ut-SeeE!$-4!g_IEE_ggEUgNIIr_Egse9!tE
6.1 Sincr the Unittd Stetes has not yet ratified GAIT, no other country
has done so. l{o*tvcr, thc rutes Laid doun in GATT are currentLy taken to be
I univcrsatty rcccpted code for the conduct of trade.
Under GATT and the rAid Code'negotiated in Geneva during the Tokyo
Round, the countrics rhich offer subsidies for the export of agricutturat
produce onto the vortd market must ensure that their exports do not exceed
rhat is knoyn 6s a ,fair share, of the yortd market.
6.2 The Unitcd Stat:s has todged a certain number of appeaLs against EEC
exports o{ given products:
- !!g-uf: thc united States accuses the EEC of having artificiaLty .increaseci
its sharc in cor[d exports and of undercutting. The EEC cLainrs in repty
that the increase in Community exports is not due to refunjs, anc that the
f lour produced in the EEc is of a di f f erent qr.ratity f ro:i Arner-ican f Lcur;
it has atso observed that 13t o't the f tour exported is producec f rom cere"Ls
imported f rom America. The United States has a share ,rf acprcx.ir,eteLy 402
in the lortd trade in uheat and uheat ftour. The EEC,s share.is abcut 152.
The American accusation that EEc exports have increased at an excessive raie
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is notto.* out by the facts: in the period betureenlg?6t?7 and 198A181,
Americln crportl rose by 50I, rhite those of the EEC rose by 252'
Egglt-plgdgglg: thc United Statcs does not accept the classification of
pa3te.products as agricul,turat produce. After chaLtenging the principte
of paylng rcfundt on nanufactured product5, it then dectared that the mode
of catcul,.ting the amount of refund ras incorrect. t'lithin GATT, it uras
deciddd not to drau up a specific report, and taLks are currentLy being
heLd bctueen thc UsA and the EEc on the method of catcul.ating the refunds-
The EEC has pointCd out in repLy that it grants export refunds onLy in
r?Spect Of the prinary commodities (in this case durum uheat and other
cereaIs) trsed in the processed products. Furthermore, Comrnunity exports
to thc USA have not reached disproportionate Levets: betneen 1977 and 1980
they increased from 15r0OO tonnes to 271000 tonnes, or from O'77' to 1 '7I
of Arncrican Production.
pgulgEx: tha unitcd st.tes obiects to the lor export prices apptied bv the
EEC. fhc EEG h-!_s rcpLicd thrt it f ixes its prices on the basis of Brazi Lian
prices. In JuLy the united states began an inquiry into Brazitian exports
and has askcd thc EEc to luppty rritten information on the method of
caLculating rcfunds.
The refunds grantcd by thc EEC in this sector'are vieved Hith extreme
dispteasure by the united States, uhich betieves that they enabte the
COmmunity tO acquire an excesSive r.crtd market share. Houever, it is a
fact that Co6munity pouttry exports are principatLy directed tcuards our
traditionat markets, nafie[y Europe, Africa and the !4iddte East, as was
moreover agrced during the Tokyo Round. Tradrtionat American markets have
been suanpcd uith pouttry from Brazit, whose exports have increased sharpty
in rccent years.
g!!rgE_!rg!!n: thc united states has protested to the EEC, cLaim'ing that
the preferentiat agreenents concluded vith certain ltlediterranean countries
are in breach of ArticLe 1 of GATT and in addition damaging to Anrerican
exports of citrus fruit. The EEC has never accepted th'is argument;
glggggsgd-lfg!!-gO9-yggglgblSg: the American protest concerns Communitv
aid for production; the USA is calting for a reform o{ the system c, aid
for proceSSing uhich, so it maintains, iS threatening American exports,
since such aid artificiatty inftates the totat European production. In the
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EEG vl*r, horcvcr, rld for proccrsing is neceittry to prcvcni the Europeen
mrkct fron bcing fl,oodcd rith lov-pricc products frorn other countries such
rs Turlcy or Austrttir, uhich connonty resort to dumping. 0n thc other
side, thc United State3 maintains tariff barriers to the importation of
frcrh frult rnd rlro rG3ortS to dumping, for ingtancc in the crse of patrs
in cyrrD.
- !gg!!: thc Unltad Etltct besce ltr grlcvancc against the Gonrnunia, on an. '
Aid Codc, rnd btmo thc rclunds gr.ntcd by thc EEC for thc fail. ln vortd
pricei. In 1976 Austratla rnd 6razit brought an action against the Comnunity
suglf poticy, rnd rcintroduced it in 1982 together nith eight other countries.
The EEC tLaiil3 ln rcptt that under thc neu market orgonization for sugar,
It is the producer: sho nurt bear the financial costg of exportation onto
thc yortd narkct, and that its measurrs are not therefore responsibte for
thc fal,l, in yortd prlces. tt har atso requested consuttations uith the
Unitcd St.tcc on thrt €ountry'r inport quotas and its tax rcbatc on sugar
crporti rh{ch, ln thc Connunity viGyr.lmounts to an erport subsidy. 
.
6.3 tn rdd{tlon to thc abovc conplaints on spGcilic products and sectorl,
the Unltcd.Statcc ir crittcrl ol Comrnunity agricutturat potlcy as a vhote.
Ulth rcgard to thG lccusrtlon of 'over-subeidizatlonr of €uropcrn agricutturc,
ye hrve atrcady ruppticd figurcs on publ,ic expeiditure in thc agricutturc
3cctor and drarn a comparison vith US expenditure. lt need onty bc added
that the cocrnunity has undertakcn not to increase agricuLturat expenditirre at
a higher ratc than oun resourccs, and that the European Par[ianent has on
several occasions dectared its support for restraint of this kind.
6.1 In repty to the comptaint that the EEC takes up an excessive share of
agricutturaI cxports, it can be argued that internationaI trade in agricutturrI
produce incrcascd at r constant ratc in the period from 1965 to 1971.
atthough thc EEC incrcesed its erports, the rate of incrcase recorded by thc
United Statcs urr GvGn highcr.
The diversification of coaunercirl outtets achicved by the EEC has never
yorkcd to thc disadvantage of othcr Gxporting,countries, in contrast, it routd
seeril, nith -the USA yhich, totLqui-ogsniftqm ihe agreenent on export8- q-t vh,eat
f tour to Egypt, r.eferred to "above, haS..conoluded.an egneenent to suppty lutter
to thit country. ln rerent yearEi Egypt has inported -ri total of appfoximate[y
SOTOOO-tonnes nf butter,.?T.OOO.tonnes,of uhich originate f rom the EEC, and
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andlbGtIGGn lorfi)O and 151000 tonncs of cheerc, Ilth Comuaity GxpoftB
acc0uhtlftg'for 121000 - 131000 tonnGs of that totlt.
0n 3 Augutt, the USA conctuded an agrecnent rlth Egypt to aupply
1ETOOO tonnes of buttcr and 101000 tonncs of checsc. The contract attovs
thc USA to incrcarc tht amount of butter to 241000 tonnts. The nuncroul
protcsts madc by the Connunity to the Intefnationt[ Dalry Products Counci[,
yith the bfcklng of Austratia and ller Zealand, havc so far cone to nothing-
6.5 lloreovcr, the Cornmunity is sttrting out on - adnittedl.y against a
background of rcsistancc and disputt - an effort to rationatize ite
agri cu I turc.
Thc probLern of gurptus production is at the centre of the Community's attention,
rnd practicaI attempts erc bclng made to avoid disposing of the surpLuses on
rortd martets by tncans of cxport suhcidies.
Uhite rishing to rnaintain lts position on the Hortcl nrarkets, and indeed
adjust certaln.traditionaI trade ftous, the EEC is endeavouring to introduce
a degree of graduation into pricc guarantees for products in surptus. Steps
have alrcady bcen taken towards this objective in the case of mitk and qheese
productsr gugar, cereats and colza, lor vhich it is intended to estabHsh
production threshoLds coupted uith reductions in aid. A co-responsibitity
levy for mitk produceri has cxisted for some years. In the sugar sGctoi,
exports are financed by producera and refiners.
6.6 To sun up, it is not reasonabte to taLk in terms of rproteCtionisa by
the EEC', os Amcricansoften do. 
,
The Europcan Comnunity is the largest wortd importer of agricutturaI produce.
In 1980 it absorbed over a quarter of totat vortd imDorts of agricutturaI
products, and recorded a tradc deficit of $32,000,000,000 in tlre agricutture
sector. 0nLy about 15I of agricutturaI inports to the EEC f.'om industriaLized
countries are covered in the 3ysten of variabte tevies. As for the rest, a
Litt[e over haLf of the agricutturaI irnports to the EEC from indusrriaLized
countries are axempt from duties and leviec on entry to the Community.
ALmost atL imports from devetoping countrieg entrr the Cornnunrt), exempt from
levies and t iabte to very lor dut ies, i f any. In 19i]1 the EEC purcl,ased US
agricutturat products to the vatue of $9,000,000,000, thereby becornrng ihe
American farmer's biggest customer. These agricutturat exports to the EEC(hatf of uhich vere exerpt fron duties and Levies) incLuded soya bearts
($2,800,000,000) 
, lorage crops ($1,600,000,000) and f ruit and.r,egcabLe products
(368010001000). Furthermore, the USA in 1981 recorded a cons'iderabLe.surpLus
in its aEricuttural trade vith the EEC, no less than 371000,000,000.
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7.1 loth th. thitcd Strtcr rnd tha Cmounity rupoort thcir aEricutture to
I m?c or lctr rquat rrtcnt tn ltnrnftrt tcrnr (ncorc ;r+port in lg82:
sl'3,000.is0affi ln thr EEc, t16r9m,+00r000 ln ttrr u6A), rtbcit yith dif,tcrent
rethodr rrd lnttrurantr.
Thc protestlvs ltrtufG3 cml,oyrd by thr tro ptrtnGrs in thctr agricuLturc
gtctorl dld not, ovtr I pcrlod of trfirty ,G.rr, prcvGnt rn Gxplnsion in
production rnd tmdr, rhloh cnGourrlid r grc.tcr dcarce of lnterdeoond.ncr
rnd rnrbled tht UEt to do hugc butinetq ln rctting mu il.tcri.ts to thc 
€EC:
durlng that thc, thr EEc, ottting out rith tlrrte rtu otteriets, dcvcLonpC.,+r"
Itrt'otn tgro-tnt*tltrlrL .ctivltirc, lnittrl,ty to rttrin r*t{.su{llclcncy in
varlour lectort .nC tub.asr.ntty +t,lm.|Jt ltt crports.
?.2 lhr prrlnt dlfflcuLtlcr of US rgricutturc do not dcrive fron thc
mchrnlrnc of thr cAP, but fron thr chrnEod ccononlc condltions: th?
?.ttrlctlrn pottclm rdoptrd ln lnduttrirttrd countrlGse thc high dottar
orchrngc rlt., thr inc..rtln0 difficuttlcr of drvctoping countries, ond host
of r[t tha olt-produclng qount?lrt, ln prylng thtir dtbtr, htvc ovcr thr trst
trc yllr3 tod to r frtl ln totrL dcund for ogrlculturrL product3, rnd tha uSA,
.l th. hrgt3t arportrr, hrr bcrn thr ftr3t to rullar fron this (rnd fron the
mbrrgo on trportl to tht USSR). thcrc hrvd ln rddttlon bron ohrngor in the
ttructurc of ruppLy on vor.td'ntrlcttl rh.rc ln lncrcutngty ieportrnt rotr is
frtl,tng to othrr coutrtrl$, fron Bruitt to Thaitlnd, os producers of rax
nrtcrirlr to rlvrl, Anrrlcln product3. Thc US response to this reversrL of
ccononic trcndt, nrnoly its dcnrrnd tO angogc o trir[ of strength uith thc EEC,
is causing drngcrour tenSloh. tthrt ls necdcd is morc thorough raltcction on
the Iayl of ldrptlng thr rgrtcutturtL ccononits of tha tro p|rtners to thc
chrngrd gupp[y rnd dmtnd structurcr on rortd nstkGtE.
7.3 Thc Gonnltttt on AgricuLtur0 Etticvor thrt tha fol,Louing points shoutd
,bi cnp,lrt3lmd to tntrtr tht thlrgc th.t thr EEc hrr brokan the rirter of GATT:
thc tccurttlon lr no tongtr vtl,ld, rlnco it tr being modc just rhcn
thr comlrrlon htr lnrtltutrd o progr.milo to ruforrr thr support
rrrchlnlrnr lor crrtrln prodr/dtt ln turp[ur, ru.r! thrt thrst nechrnlsns,
orlglnrtty tonoriwd ar, r iltrnr of rttrlnlng rttl-rufflcirncy. ntcd
updrttng ln orctr to noat a nir rlturtlon, in rhlch thr corrrdunit, is a
nit arportrr of tht productt conrcrncd;
f,,t' .
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(H it is being used as e protext, in the finel, anatysis, since a community
'' 'intrltet 
share of 10.6I, as rgainst 16U for the uSA (.rrrd in the case of
cereats 14I, as against 55I for the USA), does not Harrant the kind of
dranratization of the probLer rhich has been otserved, especiatty s{1ce
thG EEc rmains the r.argcrt inporter of us proautts; ': "
(c) it is poLiticaU,y iLLogicat, given that the qurr€nt position of the
Comnunity on yorld marhcts, buitt up over a period of tuenty years, is
. 
thc dircct resutt of an agricutfurat. poticy uhich is also fottowed.
by and ve[[ suited to the USAr. and it is therefore not reasonabte to
demrnd an instent u-turn vhich routd underminc the entire systern ofproduction rithin the 
€EC and have adversc repercussions not only onits export crpacity, but atso on the stabiLtty of its internaL rnarket
and on its comtritments to devctoping countries; the timetebte for +
adaptlng thc CAp thus nceds to be fixed with care, and in negotiations,
nlth rcspact both to the inpl,Gilentation of the conrmission propoSats and
to thc crcttlon of ne* Gonnerciar. por.icy instruments.
In the tight of these conslderations, the coftmittee on Agricu[tua. .rrr"rr.,profound concern at the oanner in rhich the USA is posing the question, namety
as an uttimatum, and at the acts of out-a^d-out aggression accompanying
this uLtimatun, such as the sate of 1,0001000 tonnes of ftour .:o Egypt.
7'4 t''hil.e it reiccts the American accusations, the conmittee emphasizes
the need for maximum ftexibiLity on the part of both USA and EEC cluring the
current round of negotiations, in order to prevent dangerous trade brars. This
woutd require an undertak'ing by the uSA to refrain from octs of aggression and
a paraItet undertaking by the EEC, without ueakening in its totat detern:.inatjon
not to yieLd to unrcasonabLe denands, to modify certain a3pects of the cpp
rhich need to be adapted to the neu conditions of suppl.y and demancl, white
retaining its fundamental' principtes. In the opinion of the ccmmittee, the
negotiations irust first of aLt be conducted on the basis of certain guidrngprinciples of a generat nature, urhich are indispensabte fcr re-estabtishing
a cIimate of harmonious coexistence, namety:
- the common determination
dcctine in yortd demand,
betyeen the American and
to remove att the obstactes yhich caused the
a decisivc factor in the changed trading relations
European systems;
-56- PE 6Er473lfin.
,,:
;:
a brerfrl coffecptlon of thc devetopment of uortd egricut,fura[ G'oonorries and.
t-
herke,jof thc changcs in suppty, rith Ecceptan6t of these changes as a
charaite.i.stic expr$8ion of m irrevirsibte htstofig;'!t*d, rh'itc mak-lng
the nceassary adrptations, both quantitative end qurl'itatlve' to one'6
ovn luP,PLY tlde; 
r''
a coilnon datarrrinatloh, ih thll pcrlod o{
to contlin crpcnditurr dcsigned t',o st$port
T
crisis nnd Sudietarl dif fitultlis-;
exportt, rvoidtrug trade Yars
- the confron conrnitnent not
autonornous dcvctoprncnt ol
of food Productlon.
to hanper, but rathcr to encoutage, the
sgrlcu[turq in deveLopinE countrlGs, ad I taans
7.5 The conraittec docs not sec it as its task to offer suggestions to '
our Amtrican ptrtnar on the methods of achieving these pol'icy objectives' As
far as thc EEC is concerned, it bel,ievcs that the adaptation of the cAP
ghout,d continue, though norc rapldl,y, as it has begun, namety touards the
graudal atlgnmcnt of Comnrunity ccreaL prices rith thoee of its princiOaL
competitors and the rcduction of intervention brices for conmodities in surptus;
theConnunitysharcinyortdcxportsmustbemaintainedandincreased,uhiLe.
observing the rutes of GATT, through a poticy of cost reduction and suitable
commerciat poLicy instruments (export credits, tong-term contracts)' in
compensation for thc phasing out of price guarantees' At the same time'
thereisaneedtopursueHithgreaterenergyapol.icydesignedtoreduce
EEC dependence on uorLd narkets through the devetoprnent of its orrn production'
especiatLy in the case of forage c.rops (soya, tegumes, oiLseeds' secondary
grain, by-Products of industrY)'
?.6 The cOmnritteG on Agriculture be[iwes there is no foundation to US
accusations that thc cAP has heLped to proLong the existence of inefficient
structures. The haLving of the number emptoyed in agricutture' the doubting
of average farm size, the significant increase in productivity over a oeriod
of tyenty years, white causing severe internat imbaLances, have nevertheIeSS
enabted the cAP to attain some of its obiectives both trithin community
territory (Articl.e 39 of the Treaty of Rome) and in the fieLd o{ trorld trade
(ArticLe 110). The vast numbers ol srnatl and medium-sized farms' the product
of a thousand yearsr histroy and an immovab[e fact in the European aEriculturat
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context, did. not obstruct thcse devetopnent, on the Gontrary' they encouraged
crop intglsification and the diversificetion of pro'iuction' The one objecti6l
uhich Cm, houever, be made rgain6t the Cfp tS that, lraVing been concentratcd
alnost crctusivcty on rnarkct support, it3 uLtinate effectr over broad ilress '.
and in variouS SOCIOrS, 1ras to squee26'Oi'rt I l'ggC nuilbqr ol snrtl farns' | - r
nore ef{ective structurat pol,icy is esstrrtlat today, both for restoting "'
batance on internal markets and for ensui{ng a nore d{versified prcsence on :"
:*:mT:,':::lll;.lll:,;::':,:':il;;:ll'"" 
benqri cir'['lo'iradins
?.7 The committee ls convinced that tnl onset of unfrir competition or an
out-and-out trade uar betrcen the gEC and the USA ovtr agricu[turaI produce
woutd entaiI ertrenety scriour consGquences, not onty uithin potitical' re[ations,
but atso for community farncrs. Thc drastic faLt in vortd prices rrhich coutd
ensuc youtd bc Of bcncfit to no-one, not even deveLoping countriet' uhich routd
be thuarted in their attcttrpts to achieve.autonofious prodtction for setf-supp[y'
In addition, given thc fe3t that . frtl" of 302 in vottd prides u6utd causc +'
an increase of 11500 ru ECU in the cost of tha EAG6F - and that iccounts onty
for the four sectofs rost heavity in surptus (cerCats, rnitk, neat, poultry)'
it is easy to undcrstand the Comnission's efforts to avoid eLiih a burden and
use the resources both in the Long-tcrn intertsts of fararers and to institute
neu proEramnes to dcvclop and restore batance in Comnunity aEriculture'
?.8 The Committee on Agricutture therefore hopes that in the short terfi'
the present tension betueen the communit, and the United States can be reduced
in a rationat manner, by restoring the sources of conftict to their correct
proporti6ns as soon ts possibte and moving on from there to the search for"'
so[utions to certain specific probLens concerning particuIar productS, so[ut{otis
uhich must be obtained through nlcasures agreed by both sideS vithin the
framework of thr cxisting systens of agricutturaI support, rhi[e leaving open
the possibitity for the modifications denanded by the generat situation'
? -9 The committee ca[ts
discussions vith the USA,
agricuLturaL disPute, and
conftict betueen the EEC
on the Commission to muttipty its contacts and
ln order to reach a rapid sotution to the current
I thus prevent a.1 intensification of the prescnt
and the USA in'the agricuLturat sector-
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g$gtur$us
The Connitteelon Agricul.tur6 raqucsts that thc Potitical, Affairs Comrnittee
include the foLl.oring conctusions in its notion for a resolution:
Ihe-EsreserE-Ber!!!E!t!!,
points out that the Communityrs agricuttural policy has never been an
obstacte to the expansion of Unitcd Stttes egriculture or to increased
trade betrccn the EEc and the usA; the usA etso hrs a system for protec-
ting and supporting its agricutturc rhlch ontaits a financi.aI commitnent
of much.the sanc size as the Cmrmityle, atso point3 out that for some
products the Conmunity is in comctition rith the USA,
- Is convinced thatthe ser,ious diff icut.tirs conf ronting United States
agricutture are the rceutt not of Comunity rncchanisns but of a series
of factors and primariLy the rortd econoai.c crisis, uhich has led to a
fal,L in demand for agricutturat products and the high doLtar rate; at the
same time some neu countries aFe puttitu on thc roftd oarket, products
previously so'Ld by the USA on a virturl nonopoly basisi
Therefore refutes the USA|s ttcuoatione that the EEC has,violated GATT
rutes and cornered more than its tfair' gharc of the vor[d market in
agricutturaI products as a resu[t of export subsidies;
Expresses its deep conc.ern at the aggressive poLicy of the USA aimed at
, boos.ting its exports by steating the Comunity's traditi,onaI markets, such
as Egypt and tlorocco, by offering prefcrentiaL price and credit conditions
inconpatibl.e rith GATT ru[es.
i
5, Considers that in orden to res,to.re a ctinate of cotLaboration and peace-
fut co-existence on the intcrnationaI aerketr,both sides Shoutd pursue
the fotlouing objectives:
- removal of the obstacles that have lcd to a drop in lortd demand;
?.
3.
4.
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mutuatty agreed adiustment of the suppty of'agriculturaI products to
changed conditions on the uortd narket in order to guarantee stable
prices and supptieb as .part ofra tore baLenccd cxpansion of international
trade;
- containment of expcnditure on cxport subsldicsi
- increased production in the deveLoping countriest
6. ltaintains that the Communityrs agricutturat poticy is ftexib[e and can
be adapted to trends on the internat and international marketsl; the
Community has atready taunched'a progranmG to rcvise its support nechanisms
for some surptus products. Betievocrhorever, that onc of thc objectives
to be pursued by the Comnunity and its main compctitors is that of asruming
responsibiLity for aLL products on the international narkets. Atso
considers that, rhiLe striving to rtttin this obioctive, confidence in
the agricri[tural. industry nust be nrintained;
Considers the cLaim that thc CAP cncourages inefficient Community agricutturaI
structures to be completety unfounded; is of the opinion that the econonic,
sociat and environmentaI pecuLiarities of Connunity agriculture require
appropriate forms of support and that the USA shoutd take note of the points
of difference;
CaLLs on the United States and Comnunity authoritics to carry on the
current negotiations rith the utnost zeaI and flexibiLity; is convinced
that unfair competition or an out-and-out'trade rar betvaen the EEC and
USA as regards agricutturaI products uou[d have very serious consequences
not onty for poLitical retations but aLso for Community farmers and there-
fore the Community as a rhole. The increase in expenditure this coutd
entait youtd jeopardize the future policies for restructuring and
devetoping Community agriculture;
See for instance paragraph 15(a) of the resolution contained in the
report by Sir Henry PLUlilB (Doc. 1-250181) rhich yas adopted on
17 June 1980 - 0J No. C 172, 13.7.1981
E.
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9. Therefore catts for a speedy reduction in the present tension betyeen the
United States and the Community in the agricultural sector and urges the
responsibte authorities to resolvc the dispute by means of specific agree-
nents on individual conrnodities or narkets on rhich the tuo parties have
different vieus; requests that the European parlianent be kept fuLty
informed at regutar intervaLs of the progress made in taLks betreen the
USA and the EEC;
Hopes that the Community uitI make a more active contribution to promote
the harmonious devetopment of intcrnationaI trade and improve the situation
of developing countries, occupying its rightfut position with regard to
the managernent of vorld markets; considers that common trade poLicy should
be strengthened by using instruments that a[lor the Community to respond
quickty to the trade policies of third countries and by concLuding [ong-
torm contracts for the supp[y of agricuIturaI products.
10.
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ANNEX I TO THE OPINION OF THE COiIIiIITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
Couoarison of thc aqriculturaI !es!erE-!a-!! s-EE9-End-!!e-u!E
Eeelgrsgn!:
1 976
1978
19E0
Ne.-s!-!erog
1977
Average surface
-----eIgg
1980
5 052 000
17.2 ha
4 371 0C0
3 937 000
2 500 0c0
163 ha
I 582
6 lab
7 727
000
c00
000
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AilItIEX II TO THE OPINIOil OF
Agricutturat erports in retation to totat
THE COTITTEE OIII AGRICIfl-TURE
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ANNEX III TO THE OPINION OF THE CO!'IFIITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
Devetcpment of trade betreen the EEC and USA ('o0o 000 Ecu)
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ANNEX IV TO THE OPINION OF THE COI{iIITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
Development of the share taken up Fy the EEC
and the USA in vortd agricutturat t r"d"1' ?
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